The NYT article reminded me that I forgot to treat of the one passage in Cannon's order that led me to read the whole order in the first place. It was this:

The Government’s argument that another round of initial screening is unnecessary also disregards the value added by an outside reviewer in terms of, at a minimum, the appearance of fairness. Even if DOJ filter review teams often pass procedural muster, they are not always perceived to be as impartial as special masters.

Judge Cannon uses legal language in a queer way. It's like when someone is speaking and gets another person's name 75% right. It sticks in your head as not quite right but but you can't pinpoint it exactly in the moment.

A common legal phrase is "avoid the appearance of impropriety." That is, the act itself is not problematic but the way it is done gives the appearance that the act is wrong. Cannon uses that recognizable figure of speech precisely backwards,...the appearance of fairness. It throws off your thinking; we want both the substance and the appearance of fairness, right. We want to avoid even where the substance is fair (as it is here in a judicially obtained search warrant) the appearance of impropriety. Compacting Cannon's written statement we get,

The Government...disregards...the appearance of fairness.

She could have aligned figure of speech and ruling by writing,

"The Government disregards the appearance of impropriety." But she did not. 

Now, per above, behind every appearance should be the corresponding substance, right? Fairness in substance, fairness in appearance; unfairness in substance, unfairness in appearance. So, does Judge Cannon's odd usage of legal language impugn (in a backwards way) the substance of the government's fairness? It does, for this is the context:

To begin, the Government’s argument assumes that the Privilege Review Team’s initial screening for potentially privileged material was sufficient, yet there is evidence from which to call that premise into question here. [citations omitted] 

First instance of hinting at a belief that the government is acting in bad faith.

As reflected in the Privilege Review Team’s Report, the Investigative Team already has been exposed to potentially privileged material. Without delving into specifics, the Privilege Review Team’s Report references at least two instances in which members of the Investigative Team were exposed to material that was then delivered to the Privilege Review Team and, following another review, designated as potentially privileged material...[citation omitted]

So, there were two reviews of the docs by the Privilege Review Team, the second of which turned up TWO instances of privileged material not so identified by the first.

Those instances alone, even if entirely inadvertent, yield questions about the adequacy of the filter review process.13 

Footnote 13: 13 In explaining these incidents at the hearing, counsel from the Privilege Review Team characterized them as examples of the filter process working. The Court is not so sure.

Pause: Judges do not write like that. A court is supposed to be sure. Once again Judge Cannon employs speculative language in her own reasoning. Once again she avoids the responsibility for deciding, which is her duty. Unpause.

But they also indicate that, on more than one occasion, the Privilege Review Team’s initial screening failed to identify potentially privileged material. The Government’s other explanation—that these instances were the result of adopting an overinclusive view of potentially privileged material out of an abundance of caution—does not satisfy the Court either. 

Instance two of belief in bad faith. "No, no government, you're not going to get away with that with me! The second review was just more inclusive, huh? Yeah, right."

... the Filter Review Team’s Report...

Which is it judge, the Privilege Review Team or the Filter Review Team? Come on, that is just sloppy.

In sum, without drawing inferences...Too late, Madam Judge. Thou has done drawed inferences and colored 'em in in colored pencil...I need to appoint a special master because, the government’s fox is left in charge of the appellants’ henhouse (quoting another case). Which presumes, which you do, judge, erroneously, that it is 45th's henhouse here.

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