Of course I am pro-British and anti-Soviet in World War II. OF COURSE I am pro-Churchill and anti-Stalin. Of course I know that Churchill was a virulent anti-Communist at all times in his public life. I also know, however, that Churchill with alacrity and enthusiasm grabbed the blood-dripping hand of the Soviets when it was at last extended as an ally. And I am made knowledgeable of Stalin's (or the "Soviet machine's" (?)) imperious telegram to WSC demanding renewals 1) of concrete commitments by Churchill and Roosevelt to "Overlord" (invasion of Europe) in Spring 1944 2) the arctic convoys to USSR in 1943. Still.

I have read all of Churchill's Second World War volumes at least once and am re-reading Volume 5 now. Never was there a happier warrior than Winston Churchill. Never a more magnanimous one. His unfeigned affection for the United States shines. His humor and personal grace burnishes all that he says and writes even in official communications to his equals on the most serious matters.

Still, I am at a loss to understand why, even at the prodding of his Foreign Minister from Moscow near the end of the Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943, he could not make a concrete gesture of Italian warships to Molotov; why he was so bureaucratic and picayune in his writing in this instance.

Eden to Churchill:

The whole talk went off surprisingly well. Stalin seemed in excellent humour, and at no point in the evening was there any recrimination about the past...it is significant that he should have gone out of his way to acknowledge the contribution we were making by merely pinning forty German divisions in the West...It is clear however that he expects us to make every effort to start "Overlord" at the earliest possible moment, and the confidence he is placing in our word is to me most striking. 

Churchill in The Second World War:

There had been many signs during the Conference that the Soviet Government sincerely desired permanent friendship with Britain and the United States. ...

Eden continuing:

Molotov has shown that spirit on many occasions...Though he was obviously disappointed at the outcome of...our failure wholly to endorse...Soviet proposals about Turkey and Sweden, he conducted our business [Molotov was the chair of the Conference] with an evident desire to avoid embarrassment to either country. As an indication of goodwill I received a message from him to-night that our two imprisoned sailors have been pardoned. 

Russian representatives have given many other signs of an intention to open a new chapter. Your gesture in respect of the convoys had made a deep impression. For the first time for many years Molotov...came to dinner at this Embassy tonight...

In this atmosphere I would give much to be able to close the Conference with some tangible evidence of our goodwill. 

This is Churchill's fucking Foreign Minister. "I would give much" if I could throw the Soviet bear a few scraps of Italian meat, "some tangible evidence of our goodwill."

I am quite sure that if I could give them some encouraging message about their desire to have a small share of the Italian Fleet the psychological effect would be out of all proportion to the value of the ships...The [British] Ambassador and [the American Ambassador] Harriman fully endorse this view. If it is impossible to give a specific reply before I leave it will be of the greatest help to me [his own fucking Foreign Minister] if I can at least tell M. Molotov that in principle [Why "in principle"??, my writing in margin] we agree that the Soviet Government shall have a share of the captured Italian ships and that the proportion which they ask is reasonable. ...If you can do this to help me...I beg your aid.

Okay? Get the drift? Churchill:

In principle we willingly admit the Russians' right to a share in the Italian Fleet. 

But 1: We had however thought that this Fleet would play its part against Japan...

But 2: The Italian warships are quite unsuited for working in Arctic waters...

But 3: We should also have to be careful lest the immediate transfer to the Russians would have an ill-effect on Italian co-operation...[Why, Why Why?! in margin.]  

But 4: We do not want to provoke a refusal by the Italians...important work they are doing for us...Taranto dockyard...

But 4a: They are doing a good deal for us...[Are they doing as much for us as the Soviets, Mr. Prime Minister?]

But 4a (i): Italian destroyers, of which there are only seven good ones, are escorting local convoys.  

But 4a(ii):Their cruisers are transporting troops and supplies. 

But 5: We should therefore in any case...ensure against publicity until...steps...counter...ill-effects. 

But 6: Once distribution of the Italian Fleet begins, the French, the Yugoslavs, and the Greeks would put in their claims, which are pretty good. [OMG, WSC just does not want to help USSR, in margin.]

But 7: Has Mr. Hull referred this request to his Government? It would be essential that we should be agreed. I should like best of all to talk over all this at 'Eureka', [meeting of Big Three] if that ever comes off.

Delay, punt to Tehran, don't commit, do nothing "tangible" to throw some crumbs of "goodwill" to the Soviets. So unlike Churchill. FDR saw this reticence also and in Tehran, FDR sided with STALIN.