One source of friction between Washington and London that continued at least through the Suez Crisis was British imperialism. With the vision (albeit that of 20/400) of a son of the American Revolution I cannot make out Winston Churchill's blindness to the wariness of revanchism in American eyes. Imperialism is racism and predatory capitalism and everywhere Britain went those two were its traveling companions. In Zimbabwe, in South Africa, in Egypt, in India (Gandhi, that "half-naked little man"), and here in World War II. Yet, "the most acute difference I ever had with General Eisenhower" was over Allied prevention of his capture of the island of Rhodes in the Aegean Sea. Rhodes? Look, I take it on faith that Rhodes was of strategic importance to the Allies; I must take it on faith for on a map of the area showing Rhodes over 900 miles southeast and away from Italy I wrote "Why would the Brits have Rhodes?" 

 

My faith in Churchill's motives is further shaken by the title of Chapter 12 in Closing the Ring: "Island Prizes Lost." It is not merely a tinny headline by a tone-deaf headline writer, it is in Churchill's text itself. The first sentence:

The surrender of Italy gave us the chance of gaining important prizes in the Aegean at very small cost and effort.

A "prize" is something to he taken and held. I take it that that is the sense in which Churchill meant it. He did not write of Italy as a "prize", he wrote of it as a country to be liberated. Still on the first page:

It seemed to me a rebuff to fortune not to pick up these treasures. (Rhodes, Leros, and Cos)

On the second page, in a minute to General Ismay:

I hope the Staffs will be able to stimulate action, which may gain immense prizes at little cost, though not at little risk.

It is cost-benefit analysis, the language of economics.

Plans and preparations for the capture of Rhodes had been perfected...

"Capture" is to take and hold, not to make free.

...my mind turned to the Aegean islands, so long the object of strategic desire.

That is one mention of strategic motive to five imperialism in two pages. Even that reads more of lust than rational strategy. To General Wilson, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East:

This is the time to play high. Improvise and dare.

...Rhodes was denied to us...It would have taken very little...had there been accord. General Eisenhower and his staff seemed unaware of what lay at our finger-tips...

 "to US"; "what lay at our finger-tips".

The small aids needed seemed very little to ask from our American friends in order to gain the prize of Rhodes...Surely I was entitled to the very small aid...

Makes clear that "us" above refers to the British.

FDR refused.

                                                                                                                  8 Oct. 43

I do not want to force on Eisenhower diversions which limit...early success...of the Italian operations......I am opposed to any diversion which will in Eisenhower's opinion jeopardize the security of his current situation in Italy...It is my opinion that no diversion of forces or equipment should prejudice 'Overlord' as planned.

Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, was almost exactly eight months away. For Churchill, too distant to forfeit the "prize" of Rhodes. Churchill continued to press FDR but his own General Wilson telegrammed his concurrence with the Americans just two days later:

If the forces which...are now necessary were to be made available this would be at the expense of 'Overlord'... 

Churchill agreed but cabled FDR the same day,

I will not waste words in explaining how painful this decision is to me.

I don't see Churchill's initial infatuation with Rhodes as strategic on the whole; rather, I think that the (British) lion's share was imperial. But as of 1951 when he wrote Closing the Ring Churchill believed that he had been right.

Rhodes caused lasting suspicion by Eisenhower, Roosevelt, and Stalin (who didn't need further cause!) of Churchill. Churchill's proposed Rhodes "diversion" is followed immediately in Closing the Ring by the chapter titled "Arctic Convoys Again". I may emphasize "Again". Churchill did not want to give his "small aids" to his ally Stalin that he wished the Americans to give him wished to "capture the prize of Rhodes." I do not see a reason complimentary to Churchill for this.