This is an ill-tempered Order, written with odd, familiar quirks, lengthier than it need have been for the legal rulings, of the length that it is only so Judge Cannon could get every criticism of Jack Smith she could think of in print. Excerpts are below. Jack Smith cannot get a fair trial by an unbiased judge in this of surpassing seriousness to national security, of ordinary complexity/simplicity, and an open-and-shut criminal case.
The Special Counsel’s response did not object to the Press Coalition’s invocation of First Amendment principles, did not meaningfully engage [she likes that; she likes to engage, meaningfully] with any of the legal standards, and did not offer any additional factual support.
Yo Smith, are you really a lawyer? Let me see your bar card.
...
Unlike the Special Counsel’s initial Seal Request [ECF No. 267], the Motion for Reconsideration proposes a legal standard and provides some additional factual support [ECF No. 294 pp. 5–20; ECF No. 296 (sealed)].
...
DISCUSSION
The Special Counsel now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s prior Sealing Order. The Special Counsel argues that (1) the Court clearly erred in applying the First Amendment standard to the seal requests, which are properly governed by the Rule 16 “good cause” standard; and (2) reconsideration is warranted to “prevent manifest injustice”—namely, protecting potential witnesses and the integrity of the proceeding.
Upon full review of the issues presented, the Court ultimately elects to consider the Special Counsel’s newly raised arguments and to reconsider its prior rulings. The Court grants the Special Counsel’s Motion in part, reasoning as follows:
A. The Special Counsel’s Newly Raised Arguments Could Have and Should Have
Been Raised Previously.
As a preliminary point, the arguments and evidence advanced in the Special Counsel’s
Motion could have, and should have, been raised in prior filings. Denial of the Motion would be
appropriate on that basis. ...the Special Counsel had two opportunities to raise these arguments and failed to do so in both instances. The Special Counsel’s initial Seal Request failed to offer a governing legal framework or any factual support for the relief sought; instead, it contained only conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions about witness safety, the integrity of the proceedings, and privacy interests. Later, in response to the Press Coalition’s Motion, the Special Counsel failed to engage [again] with—let alone refute—the Press Coalition’s argument that the First Amendment
attached to the subject materials. Instead, the Special Counsel focused solely on the elements of intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 [ECF No. 282]. Only now, after failing to meaningfully “raise argument[s] or present evidence that could have been raised”
5
“[E]ven if the Court finds that the Government’s prior filings did not adequately address the issues before the Court, it should exercise its discretion to consider the arguments and evidence below before resolving the request for continued sealed” [ECF No. 294 p. 10]. Out of an abundance of caution, and cognizant of the interests implicated, the Court agrees to do so here.
I'm saving your ass, Smith. I don't have to do this but "out of an abundance of caution", to prove that I am a knowledgeable, fair jurist and to rebut slander that I am a dim-witted, pro-Trump judge, I will consider your woeful legal product.
in these responses, Wilchombe, 555 F.3d at 957, the Special Counsel moves for reconsideration
and argues, in no uncertain terms, that the Court committed “clear error” by applying an
unobjected-to legal standard.
The same is true of the Special Counsel’s “manifest injustice” claim. The factual support
underlying this claim—i.e., the basis for the assertion that disclosure of potential witnesses’
identities could subject them to threats, intimidation, and harassment—was meaningfully
developed for the first time in the Motion for Reconsideration itself... the Special Counsel’s
sparse and undifferentiated Response fails to provide the Court with the necessary factual basis to
justify sealing.”)]. This remains true even if the Court had applied the Rule 16 “good cause”
standard, which still requires a particularized, specific showing. ...And this is to say nothing [this cat-fight language. Like a complaining wife to her husband] of the Special Counsel’s failure to comply with this District’s Local Rules ["Local Rules"? We don't put the seals on that way in the center of the legal Universe, Fort Pierce, Florida!" on sealing, which the Court has emphasized repeatedly throughout this proceeding. [citations only omitted] This served as another independent basis for denial.
...
B. Nevertheless [! To make you happy, Smith!], the Court exercises its discretion to reconsider its ruling in light of the Special Counsel’s newly raised arguments and to apply Rule 16’s “good cause” standard to Defendants’ Motions to Compel.
...Having done so, the bottom line is this. [I have never read colloquial language like that in a Court Order.] The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the instant question: whether, in a criminal proceeding, the First Amendment qualified right of access attaches to discovery materials referenced or attached in support of a publicly filed Rule 12(b) motion to compel discovery under Rule 16. ...Applying those authorities, the Court agrees with the Special Counsel’s now-developed position...These embedded scope-of-the-prosecution team and selective-and-vindictive-prosecution questions, related to broader questions of due process and alleged “bias and political animus,” give the MTC a decidedly different flavor than a “garden variety” [Colloquial; she does not use the language well] discovery filing—making the access inquiry murkier. [She is making the waters murky to make them look deep.]
Notwithstanding the still-developing and somewhat muddled questions raised in this
criminal case,
That's it for me. The entirety of "this criminal case" is "muddled" in her brain and none other. This is going to be continual and Jack Smith cannot get a fair trial.
the Court determines, for the reasons previously stated, that no right of access attaches to the disputed discovery material referenced and/or attached in Defendants’ MTC.
...
The Special Counsel argues that, in light of the Protective Order, the “good cause” burden
rests with Defendants [“[The Protective Order] presupposes that the burden is on the defendants to justify the basis for publicly disclosing presumptively confidential discovery material[.]”) (emphasis in original)]. The Court disagrees.
...
Although the Special Counsel’s request remains sweeping in nature as applied to all potential government witnesses without differentiation—and although the Court was unable to locate another high-profile case (in publicly available records) [Did you use Westlaw search term "high-profile cases" or did you Google ("publicly available records") "high profile cases"?] in which a court granted a broadbased pre-trial request to seal the identities of all potential prosecution witnesses as sought here—
the Court is satisfied that the Special Counsel has made an adequate showing on this issue under
Rule 16, at least at this juncture pending final trial preparations.
You see how she intends this to be read? Although...the Court is satisfied
13 The Special Counsel has not proposed a specific duration for the seal request, as required under the Local Rules, see S.D. Fla. L.R. 5.4(c)(1),
[Jack has not meaningfully engaged with the Local Rules. Jack, do "take care" to "meaningfully engage" with the world legal bedrock, the Fort Pierce, Florida Local Rules.]
...
b. Remaining substantive witness statements
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to the Special Counsel’s broad-based request to seal the substance of all substantive Jencks statements referenced in and/or attached to the MTC (arguing for wholesale sealing of potential witnesses’ statements to avoid “influenc[ing] the testimony of other witnesses or the jury pool”)]. By granting this sweeping and undifferentiated request—which the Special Counsel also raises in seal requests associated with Defendants’ substantive pretrial motions—the Court would be authorizing the categorical sealing of large portions of the record attached in support of critical pretrial defense motions.15
For the reasons below, the Court does not find the Special Counsel’s generalized witness- and jury-pool-influence concerns sufficient to establish good cause...
...
To date, the Special Counsel has had multiple opportunities to provide factual and legal
support for the contention that generalized witness- and jury-pool-influence concerns justify
blanket sealing of all witness statements relied on in pre-trial motions. None has been provided.
...
As for legal authority, the cases cited in the Special Counsel’s papers do not lend support
to this sweeping request; nor do they appear to have been offered as such.
Haughty, dismissive. Like a law school moot court argument.
And based on the Court’s independent research [on Google], granting this request would be unprecedented: the Court cannot locate any case—high-profile or otherwise—in which a court has authorized anything remotely similar to the sweeping relief sought here. ...
In sum, the Court finds that the Special Counsel has made a sufficient “good cause” showing to justify redactions of information in substantive witness statements that could be used to identify potential witnesses (along with witness names and P.I.I., as noted). Confident that such redactions will address the witness-safety concerns at the center of the Special Counsel’s seal request, the Court exercises its discretion to decline the Special Counsel’s wholesale request to seal non-identifying substantive witness statements, for which no particularized factual or legal support has been presented.
19 The Special Counsel’s prior submission did not specifically identify either the “FBI code name” or “uncharged conduct,” or where the Court could locate this information in the voluminous papers. The Motion for Reconsideration, however, provides sufficient detail to allow the Court to reasonably locate and rule on the requests.
Jack, provide her with an index and chapter headings and use pictures.
...
...To avoid confusion, and for docket clarity, the parties shall take care [Cannon used that same tinny language in her absurd jury instructions Order] to effectuate this docketing in sequence (MTC and opposition). ...
Jack, you're fucked brother; you are FUCKED.
