REASSESSING I


if i were suddenly made president, what would i do about this war?

the first thing i'd want to be certain about is the definition of our enemy.

the second thing is, what is our enemy's objective?

third would be what our objectives are

fourth would be what i would do to attain those objectives.

in trying to answer both of these questions (which of course have a lot of subparts) i'd want to be clear about my bases for answering them:

(1)what are the facts?
(2)i would want to be exceptionally satisfied in identifying any underlying assumptions and equally certain on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of those assumptions.
(3)besides hard facts, i'd want to know what i know, or believe to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.
(4) besides those, i'd want factors i could be reasonably correct and reasonably incorrect about
(5)in rumsfeldian terms, i'd want to know what the "known unknowns" are.
(6) and what the "unknown unknowns" are.

WHO IS OUR ENEMY

the dictionary does not help us define, for our purposes, what "enemy" means so i will take it to mean in this context as that group that i as president will mobilize my military to defeat

first let's be satisfied with who our enemy is not.

again, for our purposes here, it is not "terrorism." that's too general. we are not at war with all terrorists everywhere.

I. is it with al qaeda and/or with al qaeda-related or inspired groups?
clearly it is that, but is that all that it is? is that the
extent of our enemy?

II. is it with "militant islam" as some are now saying, and if so,
what is "militant islam?"

III. is it with islam, as i (and almost noone else) have said?

what are the facts on this question of who our enemy is?

I. is our enemy al qaeda and related groups alone?

the fact is we have not been attacked by anyone other than al qaeda, before or after 9/11. that's a strong rebuttable presumption that our enemy should be so properly limited.

the fact also is that al qaeda appears to have metastasized, as in the madrid train bombings but noone has attacked us since 9/11.

what are the assumptions behind our belief that our enemy should be limited only to al qaeda "incorporated?"

one would be that we would expect not to be attacked again once al qaeda is destroyed.

by definition, an expectation can not be known beyond a reasonable doubt. most thinkers and decision-makers believe that destroying al qaeda inc. would not completely end the problem. one can reasonably believe or not believe that. i believe it.

something else we must consider is to what extent we believe that al qaeda is synonomous with osama bin laden. in other words, if we killed/captured obl, would that in itself end al qaeda.

again, a point on which reasonable people can disagree. most informed people believe that that would certainly cripple/retard al qaeda but that there are too many followers out there who have been trained in his philosophy and methods to think that al qaeda would be destroyed if obl were.

one hopeful sign in this regard though is the success that israel has had in stopping/reducing the number of attacks from hamas by assasinating hamas' leaders. EVERYONE agrees that at least in the short term that has worked.

when we get to the second question of what i would do as president to defeat our enemy, might assasination be a tool?


II. is our enemy with "militant islam?"

let's take this as a definition of "militant islam": those who argue for and support al qaeda inc. though they have no participation in its attacks.

in considering expanding the definition beyond a.q.i. we must be aware of a danger that our minds fall into, the slippery slope.

as you move away from facts into things not facts but which you believe beyond a reasonable doubt and from there to things that it is reasonable to believe but also not to believe you get farther and farther away from certainty, a legitimate concern when you're talking about what to kill and be killed for.

equally important though must be the realization that few policy decisions are ever based only on certainty, that it is not only unrealistic to set the bar for action that high but that there can be adverse consequences also.

most sensible people would not want to wait for a direct attack before we responded. this can be but is not intended at this point as an argument for "preemption." it is just to caution about reality.

for example,although there were certainly legitimate grounds for deciding not to assasinate adolph hitler before he got the wehrmacht running on all gears, there are, especially in hindsight, equally legitimate grounds for believing that that would have been the best thing to do, and those "america firsters" who argued that we should not get involved in the european war, have long been relegated to the proverbial dust bin of history.

so expanding the definition of our enemy beyond a.q.i. is frought with difficulty and requires the absolute best set of available facts and the shrewdest judgment in which at every step we must ask ourselves: am i getting too far out on the limb of speculation and conversely am i sticking my head in the sand?

so what are the facts?

there are lots of muslim clerics, political leaders and groups who preach and urge "jihad" on america and the west and have done so for a generation or more.

it is also a fact that obl was directly motivated by these teachings to create al qaeda and to officially and publicly declare war on the united states.

therefore i am exceptionally satisfied that the definition of our enemy should be expanded to include at least some of these persons/groups. but who?

those persons/groups that specifically taught obl? yes in my opinion.

all people who that person/group taught? they would be high on the list.

should we then include different people/groups that preach the same thing to others that he/those preached to obl? probably.

we would be reasonably expanding the conceptual definition of our enemy but at some loss of individualized clarity. who are these people? can they be reasonably identified for attack?

there are going to be some, maybe a lot of people/groups that fall into a gray area: is one speech/sermon/writing enough? probably not.

how many then? dunno. we could reasonably rank them on a scale that would take into account both "quality" (what they say), "quantity" (how often they say it), how extensive their influence is, and whether they practice the violence that they preach.

it would be sort of like the deck of cards on the iraqi leadership, or like nfl draft day. every player gets ranked somewhere between 1-300 and we start at the top.

let's take the concrete example of hezbollah some respected people are saying our enemy should be expanded to include them. they have been taught and teach the same things as al qaeda. they are organized and have carried out deadly attacks against israel, but not against us.

are there any hard facts that hezbollah is going to attack us, join with or actively assist al qaeda, inc. not that i know of.

is it equally reasonable to believe and not believe that hezbollah is going to attack us, join with, or actively assist aqi? at this point based on what i know and don't know i'd have to say it is unreasonable to believe that.

are those things capable of being known? I don't know them, but i do believe that the cognescenti do and i think that if there was evidence that hezbollah was so involved that they would tell us, meaning the american people.

but hezbollah would seem to be at "face card" level in our war, would we really exclude them based on the fact that they haven't attacked us and we know of no support they have given to a.q.i.? are we turning a blind eye? a very difficult problem.

same thing with the madrid bombers.

one of the fudge factors that we would have to employ in making reasonable judgments about things is the risk involved. do we err on the side of caution for our safety with a group like hezbollah and attack them or do we not?

what are the means of attack available to them? do they have or are they seeking wmd? from what i know, a.q. is. is hezbollah? if they are then in my judgment the risk, given the other substantial common ground that they have with a.q. would make me include them in the definition of our enemy.

making judgments about risk, we must also take into account factors such as ease or difficulty in defeating them, the ramifications on other concerns like support at home and abroad for our war, the psychological effect on others who are enemies (i'm thinking here of the effect that our invasion of iraq had on muamar qadaffi), etc.


-benjamin harris