From PBS. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/obamas-iran-deal-rhetoric-working/:
GWEN IFILL:
...
So how successful was the president in making the case for the Iran nuclear agreement? We get two views.
Nicholas Burns had a 27-year career in the Foreign Service. He’s now at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. And Ray Takeyh was a senior adviser on Iran at the State Department during President Obama’s first term. He’s now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Ray Takeyh, the president had some tough words today. He talked about how Netanyahu was just wrong. He linked the Iranian opposition to the Republican Party, the Republican Caucus, and he said that he criticized his opponents as armchair nuclear scientists. But, most of all, he made this link to people who voted for the war in Iraq.
Was the president on target or off?
RAY TAKEYH, Council on Foreign Relations: I went back and actually read Jack Kennedy’s speech and commencement address at American University.
And Jack Kennedy’s speech was lofty, idealistic. I think, if I quote it right, he said we shouldn’t wave the finger of accusation or issue indictments.
I think the president was unyielding. He was passionate, but his tone was at times truculent. And he didn’t make a successful pitch to his critics. This is a technologically flawed agreement, and the president should have attempted to broaden the parameters of this, the parameters of the conversation about this agreement. I think, in that sense, the president missed his mark, and I think it was unwise.
NICHOLAS BURNS, Harvard University: Gwen, I thought the president made a very strong case on the merits.
...
So — and rather than paint the critic as the Iraq War critics, I have been up on the Hill for three weeks. I have testified four times. I have met lots of members. They come in very different forms. There are Democrats who are worried about this deal, Democrats who worry about Israel.
So I think the president would be well-advised not to try to paint his critics as warmongers, but to explain the case on the merits. The merits for this deal are very strong.
RAY TAKEYH:
...
There are aspects of this agreement that are very problematic, such as the sunset clause, where, after essentially 10 years, Iran gets to embark on an industrial-sized nuclear program. And when you have an industrial-sized nuclear, there is no inspection modality really that can detect a sneak-out to a weapon option.
The president essentially, even now, after the rejection of the deal, should there be one, has a chance to go back, renegotiate some aspect of the deal, therefore strengthen it.
[That is fantasy land. Obama is correct that getting P5+1 and Iran all together again to renegotiate is fantasy land. The agreement is fatally flawed for the reasons Mr. Takeyh says and it must be rejected. It cannot be sent back to re-write.]
GWEN IFILL: Nick Burns, I want to talk about the politics of that, but I also want to ask you about this question about sanctions and inspections and whether those are loopholes which cause legitimate concern.
NICHOLAS BURNS: Well, I think this deal is a benefit, Gwen — a mix of benefits and of risks.
There are some risks. The primary risk is that what this does is, it freezes the Iranians for 10 years, but then, after 10 to 15 years, the Iranians do have the right to reconstitute a civil nuclear program.
[There is the crucial sunset provision. The only difference between a "civil nuclear program" and a nuclear weapon program is the degree of enriched uranium.]
In my view, I support the deal, as someone who worked in the Bush and Clinton administration.
And I support it because we’re not going to be any worse off after having frozen the Iranians for 10 to 15 years at that time. We will still be a lot stronger militarily.
[The US will always be stronger but Iran will be quite a bit stronger if JCPOA is ratified. The relative distance between the US and Iran will shrink under JCPOA but JCPOA isn't about preventing Iran from launching an ICBM at New York City. JCPOA is about is about the military balance of power in the Middle East. JCPOA, crucially, will shrink the military gap between Iran and Israel but it will also shrink the gap between Iran and other Islamic states in the Middle East.]
We will still be able to reassemble a sanctions coalition,
[He is talking about reassembling a sanctions coalition in 10-15 years, not going back to renegotiate now as Takeyh was. The Burns position is that even for violations of JCPOA, no military action, only sanctions.]
if we have to do that, and I think the benefits, I think, for me, outweigh the risks. So I think that’s what the country should do.
[What "benefits" does "the country," the US, get from this?]
[The US will always be stronger but Iran will be quite a bit stronger if JCPOA is ratified. The relative distance between the US and Iran will shrink under JCPOA but JCPOA isn't about preventing Iran from launching an ICBM at New York City. JCPOA is about is about the military balance of power in the Middle East. JCPOA, crucially, will shrink the military gap between Iran and Israel but it will also shrink the gap between Iran and other Islamic states in the Middle East.]
We will still be able to reassemble a sanctions coalition,
[He is talking about reassembling a sanctions coalition in 10-15 years, not going back to renegotiate now as Takeyh was. The Burns position is that even for violations of JCPOA, no military action, only sanctions.]
if we have to do that, and I think the benefits, I think, for me, outweigh the risks. So I think that’s what the country should do.
[What "benefits" does "the country," the US, get from this?]
But the critics of this deal, Gwen, mainly in the Republican Party, have tried to say that there is an alternative, and the alternative is to walk away from these talks and sanction Iran further...
[Yes, what this blogger would want is a return to the intricate web of UN and multi-state sanctions that existed before JCPOA was ever a gleam in Obama's eye. That isn't going to happen either. JCPOA, because it took so long to negotiate and involved five other nations has erased the previous sanctions regime. There's no going back. It is JCPOA or unilateral action by the US now.]
...and wait for a better deal.
[There are people who say that and that is fantasy land.]
And the problem with that is, we have built a big global coalition, but it’s an unwieldy one. I don’t think that global coalition will stay together if the U.S. unilaterally walks out of the deal.
[Yes, what this blogger would want is a return to the intricate web of UN and multi-state sanctions that existed before JCPOA was ever a gleam in Obama's eye. That isn't going to happen either. JCPOA, because it took so long to negotiate and involved five other nations has erased the previous sanctions regime. There's no going back. It is JCPOA or unilateral action by the US now.]
...and wait for a better deal.
[There are people who say that and that is fantasy land.]
And the problem with that is, we have built a big global coalition, but it’s an unwieldy one. I don’t think that global coalition will stay together if the U.S. unilaterally walks out of the deal.
[Correct.]
The sanctions regime would likely erode.
[That is the really important point, per above.]
And here’s the really important point. If we walk away from the deal, the Iranians won’t have to live by its restrictions and they will be free to begin building a nuclear program.
[If the US lets them. If we rule out military action then that's what we'll get. GREAT WORK, OBAMA!]
...
NICHOLAS BURNS: ...it looks, Gwen, that if the vote is held, when it’s held in September, the Congress will vote, because of Republican majorities in both houses, to disapprove the deal.
The president will then veto. He said he will do that. Can the president sustain his veto? And I think everything will depend on the Democrats in the House and obviously the Democrats in the Senate. And I would be surprised if the president’s veto is overridden...
[That sounds right. Obama is going to get his way. Either Congress will approve it or they will disapprove it with slim enough a margin that they could not override a veto.]
...
RAY TAKEYH:...I mentioned the sunset clause. Iran’s development of IR-8 centrifuges, which essentially produce uranium 17 times faster, and that gives Iran enrichment capacity that is quite substantial — the verification on this deal is extraordinarily imperfect.
The president keeps talking about that this is the most intrusive verification system, and the only other verification system that was more intrusive resulted from the Iraq War and the armistice. That’s just not true.
...
The first and foremost and only test of an arms control agreement is, does it reliably and permanently control arms? There’s question about the reliability of this agreement. There is no question about its permanence. It’s like a carton of milk. It has an expiration date and we should revisit some of those aspects of it.
The sanctions regime would likely erode.
[That is the really important point, per above.]
And here’s the really important point. If we walk away from the deal, the Iranians won’t have to live by its restrictions and they will be free to begin building a nuclear program.
[If the US lets them. If we rule out military action then that's what we'll get. GREAT WORK, OBAMA!]
...
NICHOLAS BURNS: ...it looks, Gwen, that if the vote is held, when it’s held in September, the Congress will vote, because of Republican majorities in both houses, to disapprove the deal.
The president will then veto. He said he will do that. Can the president sustain his veto? And I think everything will depend on the Democrats in the House and obviously the Democrats in the Senate. And I would be surprised if the president’s veto is overridden...
[That sounds right. Obama is going to get his way. Either Congress will approve it or they will disapprove it with slim enough a margin that they could not override a veto.]
...
RAY TAKEYH:...I mentioned the sunset clause. Iran’s development of IR-8 centrifuges, which essentially produce uranium 17 times faster, and that gives Iran enrichment capacity that is quite substantial — the verification on this deal is extraordinarily imperfect.
The president keeps talking about that this is the most intrusive verification system, and the only other verification system that was more intrusive resulted from the Iraq War and the armistice. That’s just not true.
...
The first and foremost and only test of an arms control agreement is, does it reliably and permanently control arms? There’s question about the reliability of this agreement. There is no question about its permanence. It’s like a carton of milk. It has an expiration date and we should revisit some of those aspects of it.