reading woodward's plan of attack. fascinating account of decision-making in a bureaucracy. the life-changing course i took in grad school was on the study of bureaucracy. it was a boring-sounding fill-in for my semester's caseload.

woodward certainly doesn't have the whole story behind what led up to the decision to go after iraq, he acknowledges that. we probably won't until people write their memoirs and documents are declassified. but at this point, given woodward's track record, it's as good as we're going to get for a long time.

fascinating and shocking. shocking because the whole lead up to the decision to attack seems to occupy only the first 40 pages of the book. i haven't read the whole book yet but long before page 100 we're already past the decision-making phase and into the planning stage.

this is it from the book with page references:

-at clinton's urging, congress passed a law in 1998 calling for regime change in iraq. (10) THIS WAS THE PRECEDENT THE BUSHIES INHERITED. IT SHOULDN'T AMOUNT TO MUCH, IF ANYTHING, BUT IN BUREAUCRACIES ENTROPY IS ALL.

-cheney came to the vice-presidency with a sense of "unfinished business" re iraq (9). THIS WAS A KEY FACTOR.

-bush relied on cheney heavily because of his experience and lack of ambition for presidency.

-rumsfeld worked hard on bush's campaign and had a talk with bush before he was even selected as defsec where he characterized the clinton approach to being attacked as "reflexive pullback" and he thought bush's should be "forward-leaning." bush like this more aggressive approach. (19) BUSH ALREADY LEANING TOWARD BEING MORE AGGRESSIVE GENERALLY.

-in jan. '01 before cohen briefs bush, cheney tells cohen he wants him to make iraq "topic a." THIS IS ASTONISHING. ASTONISHING THAT IN JAN. '01 CHENEY WOULD STACK A BRIEFING OF A TOTALLY GREEN PRESIDENT WITH IRAQ.cohen thinks, and thinks the bushies will eventually conclude that hussein was effectively de-fanged and contained and that military removal was more trouble than it was worth. bush says he thought so too, pre-9/11. IT IS NOT CLEAR BUT CERTAINLY IMPLIED THAT COHEN DID IN FACT MAKE IRAQ TOPIC A.

-two days after the cohen briefing, tenet briefs bush. the main world threats to the u.s. were 1-obl, 2-wmd, 3-china (long term and because of its size,economically). iraq "barely mentioned." (12) I WAS VERY SURPRISED TO SEE CHINA ON THIS LIST. I
HAVE LONG HAD A STRONG SENSE OF FOREBODING ABOUT CHINA AND THE "CHALLENGES" IT WILL POSE TO US IN THE FUTURE. THIS CONCERN COMES
INFREQUENTLY BECAUSE OF MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS BUT IT'S FASCINATING THAT
IT WOULD BE #3 ON THE CIA'S LIST AT THIS TIME. I'D LOVE TO KNOW THE DETAILS OF
WHAT THE CIA THOUGHT.

-feb. 5, '01: "principals meeting" (bush not present) to discuss how to increase intel on iraq and wmd. discussed: 1-hussein winning p.r. war that sanctions were hurting people, powell wanted to tighten sanctions on certain more dangerous material. 2-u.n. had discovered and dismantled s.h.'s bio-chem wmd capability and found a "surprisingly advanced nuclear program." 3-even then, there had been "suspicious accounting for materials" and then s.h. kicked inspectors out in '98 (13)

-bush wanted more "robust" response to violations of no-fly zone than under clinton. (14) bush worried about what response would be if a pilot was shot down. THOUSANDS OF SORTIES HAD BEEN FLOWN AND NOT ONE PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN. bush wanted to know if there was a "big bang" scenario in place if that happened. (16)THIS IS IMPORTANT ONLY AS BUSH'S "I LIKE THAT" WAS TO RUMSFELD'S SUGGESTION THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE "FORWARD LEANING" RATHER THAN "REFLEXIVE PULLBACK." IN THE CONTEXT OF EVENTS TO COME IT SHOWS A PLIANT PSYCHOLOGY IN PLACE.

-feb. 16, '01: major u.s./u.k. bombing raid because s.h. close to patching together a hard-to-hit fiber optics network (14)

-march 1: principals meeting chaired by powell who wanted to focus u.n. sanctions on weapons control, which is what he brought up in feb. 5 meeting. rumsfeld concerned about "dual use items." powell thought rumsfeld was loony in his concern. heated fight between powell and rumsfeld (15).

-timeframe unclear but woodward says that at the same time that this rift between the sec's was going on there was a similar one at the next level down. wolfowitz and armitage disagree about how much to trust chalabi and how and to what extent to help any opposition inside iraq. (20)

-between may 31 and july 26: four dep. sec. meetings re iraq. they recommend heavy reliance on iraqi opposition to pressure s.h. no recommendation for direct u.s. military involvement (21).

-woodwar says, apparently in this time frame, wolfie was "fierce advocate" for toppling s.h. because (these are my quotes of woodward, not his of wolfie), "it was necessary and it would be relatively easy" (21). wolfie believes u.s. could easily overrun southern iraq and seize oil fields and that would ignite opposition forces who would overthrow s.h. (22). powell thinks wolfie's nuts. CAN'T BLAME POWELL HERE. THIS IS BAY OF PIGS REDUX THINKING AND FROM A GUY WHO WAS A POLI. SCI. PROF. WOODWARD SAYS POWELL ROLLED HIS EYES AT HUGH SHELTON AND LATER ASKED HIM IF THERE WASN'T SOMETHING HE COULD DO "TO GET THESE GUYS BACK IN THE BOX."

BUT WASN'T WOLFIE MORE RIGHT THAN SAY, COHEN, WAS? TRUE WE GOT NO MILITARY HELP FROM THE OPPOSITION BUT WE DID END UP TAKING THE SOUTH AND THE OIL WELLS ALMOST UNMOLESTED. AND REGIME CHANGE WAS AFFECTED VERY QUICKLY. IF THAT'S ALL WOLFIE, AND ULTIMATELY THE ADMINISTRATION, WERE FOCUSING ON, IF THAT WAS THEIR DEFINITION OF SUCCESS THEN IT WAS EASY. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH THEY THOUGHT ABOUT POST-HUSSEIN-OUSTER IRAQ OR HOW MUCH THEY SHOULD HAVE.

THIS IS THE DIVIDE EVEN AMONG SOME CONSERVATIVES LIKE DAVID BROOKS, WHO NEVER EXPECTED A STUBBORN AND INCREASING AMOUNT OF GUERILLA ACTIVITY POST-REGIME CHANGE. NOBODY WANTS IT, I DIDN'T EXPECT IT EITHER, BUT WHAT DOES IT REALLY MATTER? THAT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOUR DEFINITION OF "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED" WAS. IF IT WAS REGIME CHANGE PERIOD, THEN YOU CAN PRETTY MUCH DECLARE VICTORY AND COME HOME, WHICH IS WHAT BUSH IS APPARENTLY GOING TO DO.

EVERYONE, BROOKS, LUGAR, MCCAIN, BELIEVE THE SITUATION IS TOO UNSTABLE FOR US TO JUST PULL OUT NOW BUT I THINK THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED IF THE "REBELLION" WERE SIMPLY QUASHED, THAT IS, IF WE JUST KILL A FEW MORE PEOPLE.

THAT WOULD BE MY VIEW. WE HAVE SOME RECALCITRANTS IN FALUJAH AND SOME OTHER PLACES. WE NEED TO WIPE THEM OUT AND MAKE SURE WE GET OTHERS ELSEWHERE SO THAT WHEN WE LEAVE WE DON'T GET A RADICALIZED ISLAMIC STATE BUT BEYOND THAT I DON'T THINK, AND I DON'T THINK THE HAWKS ABOVE THINK, THAT WE SHOULD "NATION BUILD." THE FUTURE OF IRAQ IS FOR THE IRAQIS TO DECIDE, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR SAFETY CONCERNS.

THE ONE CONTRADICTION TO MY VIEW HERE OF WHAT BUSH AND THE HAWKS THINK IS WOLFIE'S "SHINING CITY ON A HILL" VISION FOR IRAQ.

-wolfie is relentless in pushing his view and powell is worried about the momentum he is creating. powell speaks to bush personally about not getting pushed into anything. bush says "i get it" (22). later on, woodward writes what everyone by now knows, that bush and powell never had a personal relationship, certainly not like bush and cheney had or even bush and rumsfeld had. OBVIOUSLY, THIS WOULD PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AS BUSH DECIDED WHOSE JUDGMENT TO RELY ON. woodward says there was always a little bit of competition with, and resentment of, powell that bush felt.

I REMEMBER READING SOMEWHERE THAT BUSH WOULD SOMETIMES MALICIOUSLY SAY TO POWELL SOMETHING LIKE, "WELL, IF IT'S NOT THE WORLD'S GREATEST HERO." BUSH IS SUCH A SMALL, INSECURE, LITTLE ASSHOLE.

-aug. '01: work on iraq stops because bush goes on vacation. deep divisions exist between state and defense (23)

-9/11: bush says it is the "pearl harbor of the 21st century." (24). in interviews with woodward two years after, bush explains thinking that after 9/11 s.h.'s capacity for harm became to him much more menacing, and containing him much less feasible (27). woodward writes, "worse for bush, tenet had explicitly warned him about the immediacy and seriousness of obl threat. focusing on domestic issues and a giant tax cut, bush had largely ignored the terrorism problem." "i didn't feel that sense off urgency...my blood was not nearly as boiling," woodward quotes bush as later describing how he felt. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME ALSO THAT BUSH'S SENSE OF BEING A FUCK-UP IN LIFE KICKED IN HERE. BUT HOW MUCH WOULD THIS SENSE OF HAVING SCREWED UP HAVE EFFECTED SOMEONE ELSE, SAY CLINTON, OR EVEN POWELL IF EITHER HAD BEEN PRESIDENT? AFGHANISTAN WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY ANYONE. WOULD IRAQ? I DON'T THINK SO UNDER CLINTON OR POWELL, BUT OWING MUCH LESS, I.M.O., TO BUSH'S SENSE OF HAVING FAILED AND HAVING TO PROVE HIMSELF, THAN TO THE EFFECT THAT CHENEY, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, RUMSFELD, HAD ON HIM. IT SEEMS TO ME CHENEY'S INFLUENCE ALONE WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE BEEN DECISIVE. AND RUMSFELD'S ADDED TO THE WEIGHT.

-on 9/11 itself, rumself raises the possibility of going after iraq in response. THIS IS CRITICAL. "hit s.h. at same time--not only ubl," are an aide's notes of rumsfeld's suggestion. rumsfeld asks "pentagon lawyer" to talk to wolfie about iraq "connection withe obl." (25) THE WHEELS ARE IN MOTION BIG-TIME NOW.

-sept. 12: at war cabinet meeting rumsfeld asks if 9/11 didn't present an "opportunity" to hit iraq (25)

***to be continued***


-benjamin harris