The title of the declassified portion of the DNI report is "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections," "assess" being an intelligence term of the art, similar to "find." DNI's also assesses with different adjectival qualifiers:
We assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess [NOT "with high confidence] Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign then focused on undermining her expected presidency.
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We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence. [This is a complex assessment. I have double-highlighted "aspired" because, as bad as the aspiration is the money shot is "Was their aspiration realized?, i.e. DID they affect the election outcome? They do not "assess" whether the election was in fact affected by Russian aspirations.
Here also, for the first time, and for the only time that I have seen in this careful but partial read of the report, we have a split on this "three-judge panel": All three issue concurring opinions on the lower standard, "We assess," on Russian aspirations but two, CIA and FBI, assess "with high confidence," while the third, NSA, assesses with the lower standard of "moderate confidence," the first instance of that standard also. "Moderate" seems to be (but maybe isn't) a smidgen more than "assess."{
...[W]e assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a threat to Russia and Putin’s regime.
[There is NO "We assess" clause preceding the following, which I find weird.] Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly saw as disparaging him.
We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton.
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We assess the influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-elect. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency the Russian influence campaign focused more on undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and crippling her presidency from its start, including by impugning the fairness of the election.
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We assess Russian intelligence services collected against the US primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies. In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.
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We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in'cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets.
We assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks.
Only one high confidence assessment that is a bombshell: that the campaign was ordered by Putin directly. The only of assessment with high confidence is providing the material to Wikileaks, which was assumed. Disappointment on the lack of any assessment at all on affect of Russian actions on the outcome of the election.
We assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess [NOT "with high confidence] Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign then focused on undermining her expected presidency.
...
We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence. [This is a complex assessment. I have double-highlighted "aspired" because, as bad as the aspiration is the money shot is "Was their aspiration realized?, i.e. DID they affect the election outcome? They do not "assess" whether the election was in fact affected by Russian aspirations.
Here also, for the first time, and for the only time that I have seen in this careful but partial read of the report, we have a split on this "three-judge panel": All three issue concurring opinions on the lower standard, "We assess," on Russian aspirations but two, CIA and FBI, assess "with high confidence," while the third, NSA, assesses with the lower standard of "moderate confidence," the first instance of that standard also. "Moderate" seems to be (but maybe isn't) a smidgen more than "assess."{
...[W]e assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a threat to Russia and Putin’s regime.
[There is NO "We assess" clause preceding the following, which I find weird.] Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly saw as disparaging him.
We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton.
...
We assess the influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-elect. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency the Russian influence campaign focused more on undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and crippling her presidency from its start, including by impugning the fairness of the election.
...
We assess Russian intelligence services collected against the US primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies. In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.
...
We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in'cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets.
We assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks.
Only one high confidence assessment that is a bombshell: that the campaign was ordered by Putin directly. The only of assessment with high confidence is providing the material to Wikileaks, which was assumed. Disappointment on the lack of any assessment at all on affect of Russian actions on the outcome of the election.