TEXAS & P. R. CO. v. BEHYMER , 189 U.S. 468 (1903)
Decided April 20
Guess what this case was about? A P.R. firm? Wrong, industrialization breath. A railroad. This is a tort, however.
Now, how would I expect Mr. Justice Holmes, in his fourteenth opinion of his first year on the high court, to rule here--based on his "experience", the culture of the time? I would expect him to be unsympathetic to the worker, for such is the injured plaintiff, if the law at all permits him to be. Plaintiff, Behymer, won at trial, the Railroad appealed, apparently unsuccessfully, and then appealed agayne to the Supremes. Let's see what Holmes does. The opinion is only three pages long and the Court was unanimous.
This is an action for personal injuries, brought by an employee against a railroad company. It was tried in the circuit court, where the plaintiff had a verdict. It then was taken to the circuit court of appeals on a writ of error and bill of exceptions by the company, and now is brought here on a further writ of error, the company being a United States corporation. A good deal of the argument for the railroad is devoted to disputing the testimony of the plaintiff below and arguing that the verdict was excessive, but of course we have nothing to do with that. [citations omitted] We must assume the most favorable statement of the plaintiff's case to be true...That statement may be made in a few words.
Holmes is usually good to his word on few words, just not in the last execrable San Diego water rates case.
The fundamental error alleged...is that the court declined to rule that the chance of such an accident as happened was one of the risks that the plaintiff assumed, or that the question whether the defendant was liable for it depended on whether the freight train was handled in the usual and ordinary way.
Those get many an industrial corporation off the hook.
Instead of that, the court left it to the jury...
If Holmes is to rule for the injured, this is his hook.
to say whether the train was handled with ordinary care; that is, the care that a person of ordinary prudence would use under the same circumstances. This exception needs no discussion.
I'll discuss it: Holmes.
The charge embodied one of the commonplaces of the law. What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.
Well-discussed, Holmes. A neat, compact turn of phrase.
[citations omitted] No doubt a certain amount of bumping and jerking is to be expected on freight trains, and, under ordinary circumstances, cannot be complained of. Yet, it can be avoided, if necessary, and when the particular and known condition of the train makes a sudden bump, obviously dangerous to those known to be on top of the cars, we are not prepared to say that a jury would not be warranted in finding that an easy stop is a duty.
The use of double negatives to make a positive is tedious. Better-discussed: "We are prepared to say that a jury would be warranted in finding that an easy stop is a duty."
If it was negligent to stop as the train did stop, the risk of it was not assumed by the plaintiff.
It was argued that Behymer had aggravated the injury by refusing proper surgical treatment.
So we caused it. BIG deal. If he had had the proper surgery he might be running track today!
With regard to this the jury were instructed in substance, but at more length, that it was his duty to submit to all treatment that a reasonably prudent person would have submitted to, in order to improve his condition, and that no damages could be allowed which might have been prevented by reasonable care. It is suggested that, as a prudent man, he might have postponed recovery from his injury to recovery of damages. The instructions plainly excluded such a view. The argument hardly is serious. We have examined all the minute criticisms on the rulings and refusals to rule, and discover no error. We deem it unnecessary to answer them in greater detail.
Judgment affirmed.
Well-discussed, Holmes! I detect some real empathy for the little man here. Don't know where empathy fits with pragmatism.
