The Bhutto Assassination, America, Pakistan, and The Clash

In the long-ago Cold War, America "tilted" toward

Pakistan in its continuous subcontinent feud with

India. Our countries have remained cordial ever

since. In the "war on terrorism" President Musharaff

was one of the most outspoken (if somewhat panicked)

in the world, certainly in the Islamic world, in

condemning the attacks. He pledged help to the

Bush administration, and has delivered some.


The old bromide that politics makes strange bed-

fellows applies here, of course. India is the world's

largest democracy; Pakistan has had far more coups

than free elections. India is a stable country;

Pakistan has gone through more leaders than

Lincoln went through generals. Finally of course,

Pakistan is Islamic and India is Hindu and our Clash

is with Islam.


Bedfellow Bush has snuggled up to bedfellow

Musharraf, to the detriment of both countries, and to

our side in the Clash. He has done all that he can to

protect Musharraf against surges of Islamist violence

and assassination attempts. On the bedfellows theory

that would seem to be a good thing, but it's not. The

Musharraf regime is about to fall, that will be one of

the results of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto

today, and in it's place will be...who knows in Pakistan,

but eventually, probably later rather than sooner, an

Islamist government. And this one will have the bomb.

That's a very bad thing. Pakistan developed and test-

launched its bomb under President Musharraf, and

with President Bush looking on, or looking the other

way.


The most vital threat that America faces in the Clash is

an Islamic bomb in the wrong hands. That is closer to

happening today than it was yesterday.


The bed-fellows approach has produced this result.

The U.S. never should have permitted Pakistan to

develop its atomic capability. This day was foreseeable.



In the Clash, instead of the bedfellows theory that

delays the inevitable, this page has proposed an

opposite theory, of encouraging the inevitable.

We have called it "constructive provocation" and,

applied in the context here, the U.S. would have, if

necessary, bombed the Pakistani nuclear facilities out

of existence. That would have brought down the

Musharraf regime. Constructive provocateurs would

say, better sooner than later, better by our action than

the improvised reaction that the bedfellows theory

produces, better that we fight the Clash at a time of

our choosing rather than the enemy's. Whatever one

thinks of theories, we should have prevented the

Pakistani nuclear capability by all means necessary.


Long before President Bush, America should have

gotten out of bed with Pakistan. Pakistan shares none

of America's values. The bedfellows approach shunts

that consideration aside--for defensible reasons--for

geopolitical expediency. But there's the rub. The

bedfellows theory is supposed to be temporary and,

given the "strange" relationships it produces, it is

critical that each relationship so produced be

constantly reevaluated.



It has been the long-standing view here* that Pakistan

has not been a net plus for America in the Clash.

Rather, we have consistently argued that Pakistan and

Saudi Arabia are our greatest enemies. Shortly after

9/11 The New York Times Magazine did a story on

President Musharraf's madrasahs, the Pakistani schools

that inculcate Pakistani children in Islamist hatred.

As does our other major "friend" in the Islamic world,

Saudi Arabia, the madrasahs were one way for President

Musharraf to buy off Islamist threats to him personally,

and to his regime. The result for America however is a

new generation in Pakistanis--and Saudis--who, when

they come of age, will act out their school lessons with

the violence and hate that they were taught.

Additionally, U.S. intelligence indicates that Osama

bin Laden is alive and well. In Pakistan. In that "lawless"

tribal area in the mountainous border region it shares

with Afghanistan. Reportedly, we had a bead on bin

Laden in that area of Pakistan at one point, but

Secretary Rumsfeld called off military action for fear

of destabilizing our "friend." Acting under a theory of

"constructive provocation," obviously the U.S. would

have gone in and gotten bin Laden.



President Musharraf's fiat does not extend over a large

geographic area of his country; he does not rule the

hearts and minds of a large segment of his people;

he hasn't been able to produce bin Laden; our

ability to capture bin Laden ourselves has been

thwarted by concern for our bedfellow; and he

is teaching his youngsters to make jihad on us.


Another old bromide comes to mind, with friends like this...




* Our Friends in Pakistan, May 29, 2002.