Or would it? Ah, you see, that is a good question. "If a tree fell in the forest and there was no one around to hear it did it make a sound?" That was Bishop Berkeley's question. That is a different but similar question. Bishop Berkeley's question went to the nature of the physical world and of human knowledge. Sound is detected by one of the five senses. If no homo sapiens heard it did the frigging tree make a sound? Not to us homos. What if a frigging bat heard it? Then in frigging bat world it made a frigging sound. Who cares? Now, a Berkeleyan formulation incorporating protesting Egyptians would be "If an Egyptian protested and no one was around to hear him (or her) would he (or she) make a sound?" This is a tremendous formulation of the question because it incorporates modern content-blocking software which was not available in Bishop Berkeley's time. As in Bishop Berkeley's original formulation incorporating trees the answer would be no as to humans, however it would be as to bats. But the point of Bishop Berkeley's question went to the nature of all human knowledge, not just what we hear. So, I, Benjamin Harris, have not heard with my own ears a single frigging protesting Egyptian. But I still know about it, i.e. it is within my knowledge as a homo, and is no less aggravating that I don't frigging actually hear it. So Bishop Berkeley's literal question reduces human knowledge to the sense of hearing which is really frigging stupid of Bishop Berkeley and is also aggravating. However, Bishop Berkeley's question is more fundamentally inapposite to our question which, reformulated, is "If protesting Egyptians are public occurrences are non-protesting Egyptians public occurrences?" This question leaves out bats and confines itself to humans. It is a less stupid question than Bishop Berkeley's because it deals with all five human senses. It is also a more subtle question because it confronts us with the relative importance of all the zillion frigging things comprising human knowledge. So, protesting Egyptians have been public occurrences because it was unusual, it was outside the norm. Normally Egyptians just sat there looking at the Pyramids with their fingers up their asses. Egyptians with their fingers up their asses was not a public occurrence. Then they started protesting and that was unusual. Protesting Egyptians became public occurrences, Egyptians with their fingers up their asses ceased to be public occurrences. Now that Egyptians have been continually protesting for two years protesting Egyptians are relatively non-public occurrences and non-protesting Egyptians are, relatively, public occurrences. So that's the answer to the frigging question.
Monday, December 10, 2012
Or would it? Ah, you see, that is a good question. "If a tree fell in the forest and there was no one around to hear it did it make a sound?" That was Bishop Berkeley's question. That is a different but similar question. Bishop Berkeley's question went to the nature of the physical world and of human knowledge. Sound is detected by one of the five senses. If no homo sapiens heard it did the frigging tree make a sound? Not to us homos. What if a frigging bat heard it? Then in frigging bat world it made a frigging sound. Who cares? Now, a Berkeleyan formulation incorporating protesting Egyptians would be "If an Egyptian protested and no one was around to hear him (or her) would he (or she) make a sound?" This is a tremendous formulation of the question because it incorporates modern content-blocking software which was not available in Bishop Berkeley's time. As in Bishop Berkeley's original formulation incorporating trees the answer would be no as to humans, however it would be as to bats. But the point of Bishop Berkeley's question went to the nature of all human knowledge, not just what we hear. So, I, Benjamin Harris, have not heard with my own ears a single frigging protesting Egyptian. But I still know about it, i.e. it is within my knowledge as a homo, and is no less aggravating that I don't frigging actually hear it. So Bishop Berkeley's literal question reduces human knowledge to the sense of hearing which is really frigging stupid of Bishop Berkeley and is also aggravating. However, Bishop Berkeley's question is more fundamentally inapposite to our question which, reformulated, is "If protesting Egyptians are public occurrences are non-protesting Egyptians public occurrences?" This question leaves out bats and confines itself to humans. It is a less stupid question than Bishop Berkeley's because it deals with all five human senses. It is also a more subtle question because it confronts us with the relative importance of all the zillion frigging things comprising human knowledge. So, protesting Egyptians have been public occurrences because it was unusual, it was outside the norm. Normally Egyptians just sat there looking at the Pyramids with their fingers up their asses. Egyptians with their fingers up their asses was not a public occurrence. Then they started protesting and that was unusual. Protesting Egyptians became public occurrences, Egyptians with their fingers up their asses ceased to be public occurrences. Now that Egyptians have been continually protesting for two years protesting Egyptians are relatively non-public occurrences and non-protesting Egyptians are, relatively, public occurrences. So that's the answer to the frigging question.