Putin Seems to Sideline Advisers on Ukraine, Taking a Political Risk
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An early sign that something might be amiss came on Monday in a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council. Mr. Putin seemed to expect all of the assembled officials to unquestioningly advise him to recognize the independence of Russian-backed separatist regions in eastern Ukraine — a public show of elite support for war, just days before it began in earnest.
But Sergei Naryshkin flubbed his line.
Mr. Naryshkin, the director of foreign intelligence, stuttered uncomfortably when Mr. Putin asked him about recognizing the separatists’ claims. Then he seemed to overcorrect, saying he thought Russia should recognize the breakaway republics as “part of Russia.” Mr. Putin snapped impatiently that Mr. Naryshkin should “speak clearly,” then said dismissively that annexation “was not under discussion.”
I saw that exchange; to my eyes and ears Putin did not "snap impatiently", but I am not an expert Putin observer.
The moment seemed so significant because all authoritarian leaders rule by coalition, even if, like Mr. Putin, they often appear to be wielding power on their own.
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...the exchange with Mr. Naryshkin, gave the impression that Russian president had kept this crucial group out of the loop on his plans.
“He seemed to be humiliating some of these people, — particularly in the way he spoke to Mr. Naryshkin...
I have read that previously. I did not see that either, but (see above)
...even the seating arrangements of Mr. Putin’s recent meetings, in which he has placed himself at a literal distance from his advisers, convey an image that he is separated from everyone, including his elite coalition. It could be because he wanted to avoid catching the coronavirus, reportedly a significant fear for the Russian leader. But some observers...believe Mr. Putin intended to convey the impression that he is the king, and his advisers mere courtiers — a message they might not appreciate.
I am not (see above agayne) but I am uneasy with this armchair psychoanalysis, and there has been much of it, when there is any rational explanation to the contrary, in this case not wanting to catch COVID. The social distancing was extreme, as it was in his meeting with Macron, and is paranoid. I don't see the reason to go from that armchair diagnosis to deliberately conveying the impression that he is king.
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... public anger over the war could undermine [him], and even become a political liability. The war will strain the Russian economy. And it has already been a blow to Mr. Putin’s public image as a careful and pragmatic steward of Russian interests.
There was low public support for war in Ukraine even before casualties began to mount. A long-running academic survey found in December that only 8 percent of Russians supported a military conflict against Ukraine, and only 9 percent thought that Russia should arm Ukrainian separatists.
...Putin’s actions this week suggest he is concerned about the consequences of public anger. On Thursday and Friday, the police arrested hundreds of people who turned out to protest the war in cities across Russia. On Saturday, the government limited access to Facebook and other media sites for the apparent offense of posting stories “in which the operation that is being carried out is called an attack, an invasion or a declaration of war.”
... the stakes for Mr. Putin in maintaining his relationship with his inner circle: “Because of the resources and access that they have, elites pose the biggest threat to authoritarian leaders. Retaining the support of elites is thus crucial to remaining in power.”
I thought of this when I read that the U.S. and others had targeted Putin and Sergei Lavrov personally with sanctions. Thomas L. Friedman had written correctly that Putin is now an international pariah. Now, so is Lavrov. I can't imagine that Lavrov, the face of Russian diplomacy to the world, respected for his penetrating negotiations, is okay with becoming Ribbentrop.
And wars often pose a particular threat to leaders’ relationships with elites. “The relationship between authoritarian rulers and their core of elite supporters can be strained when dictators wage war abroad — particularly where elites view the conflict as misguided”...
Public anger over war can also increase elites’ perception that a leader is no longer an effective protector of their interests. And if the United States and Europe manage to impose effective sanctions on members of Mr. Putin’s elite coalition, that could make the war costly for them as individuals, as well as risky for Russia.
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Elite dissatisfaction could affect [Putin's] responsiveness to targeted sanctions, for instance, or the constraints he might face on resources for the conflict in Ukraine. It also could affect whether he has the political capital to stay the course if domestic opposition grows.
“Two-thirds of authoritarian leaders are removed by their own allies...If he tightens the screws too much, if he tries to really increase his power at the expense of the ruling authoritarian coalition, then he is threatening his own position.”
I confess that I have had this thought bubble. The Soviet Politburo got rid of Khrushchev after the Cuban Missile Crisis fiasco. It is my sense that Putin's oligarchy is not 100% behind this war with varying degrees of dissatisfaction, I would think most so with Lavrov. It is embarrassing, humiliating, to carry water for a man who is making irrational decisions--just ask those who worked for Trump!--and becoming an embarrassment and pariah yourself, but in no case is it my sense that it rises in any of them to actionable dissatisfaction. How many of Hitler's aides took action to remove him? Trump's? To a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt I believe that we are stuck with Putin and the consequences of whatever mental deterioration he is experiencing.
