Saturday, June 30, 2012

"Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust."

Alright fine, I'll read this...


I should have read this a long time ago...


Important...




F****** Chinese!...Why are they so stupid...kick their a***...God they're exasperating...
















I KNEW I shouldn't have read this...




Oh God...F****** Americans, why are we so stupid...Dec of Ind...Pennsylvania...Exasperating...








WHY did I pick this up...


It's not as bad as with the Soviets...


This should be doable...


IS this doable...I don't know if that is wise...That's it?....Maybe this isn't doable...Damn Chinese.






This is from the Brookings Institute. I wrote a post on it a few months ago based on a summary in a New York Times article. The Times article was accurate as far as it went. I have now read the monograph itself.
The monograph is important because it gives a candid look at how PRC leaders think of the U.S. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi are the co-authors. The finished product resembles the Shanghai Communique with each author writing a separate section on his government's views of the other with no co-editing.


Distrust is more pronounced among Chinese leaders than among American leaders. Chinese (typically) blame their distrust on the Americans, on American "policies, attitude, and misperceptions," according to Wang. Typically, Chinese distrust is rooted in history, in the founding of the PRC in 1949 and going back to 1900 and the "Century of Humiliation." They do not get over things...Zhou Enlai REPEATEDLY brought up Dulles' handshake snub with Kissinger and Nixon. Chinese distrust has DEEPENED in recent years.  How could that be?  Why would they be MORE distrustful of America after thirty years of contact and trade?  Because they are paranoid (Wang doesn't say that) and have a bone in their brain (or that).  Wang says the reasons for the distrust are, inter alia, human rights, that every time the Americans raise that subject the Chinese see it as interference in their internal affairs and interference in their internal affairs is one prong of an American conspiracy "to prevent China from becoming a great global power."  Every bilateral disagreement or negotiating point is viewed as part of this American conspiracy:

-A strong dollar: part of the American conspiracy for world domination.

-A weaker dollar: American attempts to get China to allow the Renminbi to rise in value against the dollar are viewed by Chinese as "unreasonable."

-The weaker dollar caused by the 2008 financial crisis: "Kidnapping," "cheating," "stealing," "plundering," "irresponsible."  Why?...How?...Because, see, since China bought (not "was forced to buy," bought) strong-dollar U.S. Treasury securities China lost money in the financial crisis. But, China continues to buy them, is practically being forced to continue to buy them because China's leaders "see few alternatives."

-Bush41 Iraq War over Kuwait: For oil. Number of oil fields seized by America in war: zero.

-Bush43 Iraq War: Ditto. And Ditto.

-Arab Spring: "U.S. sympathies" for the protesters part of longstanding U.S. conspiracy of "peaceful evolution" against communist countries like China.

-Libya, Syria 2011-12: "Western" intervention (to enforce a U.N. resolution) "perturbed" China. Current "U.S. schemes" (Wang's term) calculated to be to China's detriment.

-U.S. counter-terrorism generally: Done simply to expand American influence.

-Global warming: This is one of my favorites. Chinese leaders agree with American right-wingers that global warming is a myth.  Why do they believe that, or what is the consequence of that belief?:  it's a scientific myth perpetrated by Americans to get China to cut greenhouse gas emissions because the Americans want to deprive China of the use of its coal for its economy. China really does see economics as a zero-sum game as both authors note.

-Chinese attacks on Google: Google was "inflaming anti-government sentiment among China's netizens" so American support of Google was interference...Yeah.

-Liu Xiaobo Nobel Prize: "Orchestrated" by U.S.

-Dalia Lama: U.S. support of and sympathy...interference. With every American human rights effort "Leading Chinese observers continue to view U.S. policy toward China as aimed to 'Westernize' and 'divide' the country."

-North Korea: U.S. fault.

-Better U.S. relations with India, Vietnam: Both threats to China because China fought wars with both (American Vietnam War doesn't count; close Indian ties with former Soviet Union don't count).

It just goes on and on. Everything America does--and doesn't do--is seen as a threat to China.

The 2008 financial crisis, and the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis did not make China's leadership skittish about Deng Xiaoping's paradigm shift to capitalism, they emboldened the leadership, according to Mr. Wang. The Center now believes that China presents a competing authoritarian model to democratic capitalism to the world, "The China Model" or the "Beijing Consensus."  This is the Chinese historic arrogance, the flip side of their fear. America, the Center believes, lacks confidence and "competence," a much-used term here recently. China has achieved on its own: "Chinese leaders do not credit these successes to the United States or to the U.S.-led world order...In the past when they respected America for its affluence and prowess it [i.e. America] was somewhat credible...; now this nation is no longer that awesome, no is it trustworthy..."


"In the past."  China's leaders today do not even respect America!  Astonishing.


The astonishing attitudes of the "New" confident, competent China date from 2008 according to Mr. Wang, the year of the Beijing Olympics and the world financial crisis. And one more thing in 2008, the election of Barack Obama, a black man, to the presidency of the United States. Given these three things from 2008 it is  no wonder America lacks confidence and competence. Americans know they are in decline compared to China.  This is how Mr. Wang summarizes the thinking of Chinese leadership:

"The rise of China, with its sheer size and very different political system, value system, culture, and race, must be regarded in the United States as the major challenge to its superpower status."


They think we think China is our main challenger because of China's "size, political system, values, culture, race."

"Many" Chinese people, not just the leaders, according to Mr. Wang, expect new, confident, competent China to have a more "can-do" (his term) foreign policy. With this I retract my prediction that the Chinese people will resist any foreign military assertiveness by their government.


Both Mr. Lieberthal and Mr. Wang point to certain international flashpoints in Asia that could lead to a military confrontation between America and China. Taiwan is one.  For ten years this page has taken the position that America should cut loose from Cold War-inspired treaties and alliances: NATO, for instance. Instead, NATO has been expanded.  Taiwan is another. Taiwan is one proof that Chinese can be democratic. Democracy is one of America's deeply held values. The United States government and its people have deep respect, affection for and commitment to the Taiwanese Chinese. The United States also recognizes the unity of Taiwan and the People's Republic. Yet...yet, the U.S. continues to sell advanced military equipment to Taiwan. Thus when the PRC decides to unite Taiwan and the "mainland" politically, that is forcibly, American leaders will either defend Taiwan militarily, or back down. This was folly ten years ago, 30 years ago, today. America does not have will, nor the strategic interest to engage in a military conflict with the PRC across the Taiwan Strait, for godssakes. If war is to come between China and America, America must fight where it has the will and when it's national security is at stake. America should stop selling military equipment to Taiwan.

The Philippines are another potential flashpoint. America has a 1951 military treaty with the Philippines, relations between the two countries go back to the beginning of the 20th century. China has been testing this relationship recently in a territorial dispute. America has an interest in the sea lanes, in the natural resources in the South China Sea; America's national security is not at stake. The treaty should be abrogated, should long have been abrogated,  America should not put itself in a position of having to defend the Philippines against China.

President Obama's "Pacific Pivot."  Taiwan, the Philippines--and Vietnam, Myanmar, Korea--are flashpoints more so now because the president has shifted American military attention from the Middle East to the Western Pacific, which is now a "vital region for its future" according to Mr. Lieberthal's section on American thinking.  Meanwhile the People's Liberation Army wants to limit foreign military involvement in what it terms the "near seas." Okay, if we shift from the Middle East to the Far East what is next, an interstellar pivot? America should pivot back to the Atlantic.

China is giving indications it is preparing to come closer to America to fight a war, according to Mr. Lieberthal. China's military has given top priority to adding attack capabilities specifically targeting American "military platforms," i.e. satellites and aircraft carriers. China has also been actively engaging in cyber warfare against U.S. government and private entities. Those actions are the product of China's arrogance. Chinese leaders are deeply overreaching here and deeply underestimating America's ability, and will, to fight back. This is the ground on which America will go to war with China, and win. We should let China "pivot" to cyberspace.

Lieberthal and Wang jointly wrote the concluding section, "Building Strategic Trust." They italicize that they are not making specific recommendations, just suggesting some "ideas." One is to encourage direct Chinese investment in America, like Toyota has, for example. I would make that a specific recommendation, I don't know why they wouldn't or why anyone would object. American companies have long set up shop in China. It would, as they say, build trust on both sides, by letting Americans see that Chinese can be good employers, by letting Chinese see what the attitudes of the American people are. Another idea is sort of the reverve, to have America sell advanced technology to China (rather than have them steal it). The Obama administration has indicated from the beginning that they would do that, according to the authors, and failure to deliver by the November elections would add to China's view of the U.S. as untrustworthy. The authors also suggest that the U.S. should make its intentions clearer to China in international situations like those discussed above. The Americans are not going to do that, we're pivoting toward the Pacific instead.

As America pivots toward the Pacific it is encountering a competent, relevant regime that shares none of its values and distrusts everything it does. China is paranoid, the definition of which is irrational fear. I retract my assertion that Chinese would not sneak attack America because they are rational. With Chinese attitudes being as deep and multi-faceted as Mr. Wang lays out, the ideas suggested by the authors stand paltry chance of changing them. The Chinese attitudes are just, plain wrong.