Happy Easter all you bunny wabbits.
Saturday, April 04, 2015
"Iran’s Persian statement on ‘deal’ contradicts Obama’s claims."-New York Post.
This article is written by Amir Taheri. http://nypost.com/2015/04/04/translated-version-of-iran-deal-doesnt-say-what-obama-claims-it-does/This has to be the first time that the New York Post has ever been quoted seriously here. The Post's politics are unhidden in the original, however, I have deleted the editorializing. Of course, it could be that the Post's politics have infected even its ability to provide accurate translations. However, in my judgment that is unlikely given the ease of fact-checking.
I am relying solely on Mr. Taheri's accuracy in this article to make the following statements: I did think, and almost wrote, that it was suspicious that all of the media quoted in an earlier post--The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, BBC, vox.com, the Washington Post--immediately hailed "Parameters." It was done so quickly that there was a whiff of being canned, like it was written partially beforehand. I did write that the Mogherini-Zarif presser was much ado about nothing and I have written today of the more subtle muddying of the waters in order to make them look deep in "Parameters" itself. It never entered my mind however that something as fundamental as the linguistic versions of the text could be different. I took it without a whiff of doubt that the Iranian version of "Parameters" had as its first word the Persian word for "Parameters!" Not true, says Mr. Taheri. Not even close. Not only are the Iranian and American versions different, says Taheri, but the American version differs meaningfully from the Italian and French! Assuming Amir Taheri's article is true, the American people have been deceived, spectacularly so.
“Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline,” The New York Times headline claimed on Friday. That found an echo in the Washington Post headline of the same day: “Iran agrees to nuclear restrictions in framework deal with world powers.”
...there has been no agreement on any of the fundamental issues...
...
First, we have a joint statement...by Iranian Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif and the European Union foreign policy point-woman Federica Mogherini...
Next we have the official Iranian text, in Persian...
They amount to different, at times starkly contradictory, narratives.
The Mogherini and French texts are vague enough to be ultimately meaningless, even as spin.
The Persian text carefully avoids words that might give the impression that anything has been agreed by the Iranian side or that the Islamic Republic has offered any concessions.
The Iranian text is labelled as a press statement only. The American text, however, pretends to enumerate “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and claims key points have been “decided.” What remains to be done is work out “implementation details.”
...
The Iranian text opens by insisting that it has absolutely no “legal aspect” and is intended only as “a guideline for drafting future accords.”
The American text claims that Iran has agreed to do this or that, for example reducing the number of centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,500.
The Iranian text, however, says that Iran “shall be able to . . .” or “qader khahad boud” in Farsi to do such a thing. The same is true about enrichment in Fordow. The Americans say Iran has agreed to stop enrichment there for 15 years. The Iranian text, however, refers to this as something that Iran “will be able to do,” if it so wished.
Sometimes the two texts are diametrically opposed.
The American statement claims that Iran has agreed not to use advanced centrifuges, each of which could do the work of 10 old ones. The Iranian text, however, insists that “on the basis of solutions found, work on advanced centrifuges shall continue on the basis of a 10-year plan.”
The American text claims that Iran has agreed to dismantle the core of the heavy water plutonium plant in Arak. The Iranian text says the opposite. The plant shall remain and be updated and modernized.
Kerry and Obama:...the Iranian nuclear project and its military-industrial offshoots would be put under a kind of international tutelage for 10, 15 or even 25 years.
However, the Persian, Italian and French texts contain no such figures.
The US talks of sanctions “ relief” while Iran claims the sanctions would be “immediately terminated.”
The American text claims Tehran has agreed to take measures to reassure the international community on military aspects of its nuclear project...There is absolutely no echo of that in the Iranian and other non-American texts.
I am relying solely on Mr. Taheri's accuracy in this article to make the following statements: I did think, and almost wrote, that it was suspicious that all of the media quoted in an earlier post--The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, BBC, vox.com, the Washington Post--immediately hailed "Parameters." It was done so quickly that there was a whiff of being canned, like it was written partially beforehand. I did write that the Mogherini-Zarif presser was much ado about nothing and I have written today of the more subtle muddying of the waters in order to make them look deep in "Parameters" itself. It never entered my mind however that something as fundamental as the linguistic versions of the text could be different. I took it without a whiff of doubt that the Iranian version of "Parameters" had as its first word the Persian word for "Parameters!" Not true, says Mr. Taheri. Not even close. Not only are the Iranian and American versions different, says Taheri, but the American version differs meaningfully from the Italian and French! Assuming Amir Taheri's article is true, the American people have been deceived, spectacularly so.
“Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline,” The New York Times headline claimed on Friday. That found an echo in the Washington Post headline of the same day: “Iran agrees to nuclear restrictions in framework deal with world powers.”
...there has been no agreement on any of the fundamental issues...
...
First, we have a joint statement...by Iranian Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif and the European Union foreign policy point-woman Federica Mogherini...
Next we have the official Iranian text, in Persian...
They amount to different, at times starkly contradictory, narratives.
The Mogherini and French texts are vague enough to be ultimately meaningless, even as spin.
The Persian text carefully avoids words that might give the impression that anything has been agreed by the Iranian side or that the Islamic Republic has offered any concessions.
The Iranian text is labelled as a press statement only. The American text, however, pretends to enumerate “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and claims key points have been “decided.” What remains to be done is work out “implementation details.”
...
The Iranian text opens by insisting that it has absolutely no “legal aspect” and is intended only as “a guideline for drafting future accords.”
The American text claims that Iran has agreed to do this or that, for example reducing the number of centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,500.
The Iranian text, however, says that Iran “shall be able to . . .” or “qader khahad boud” in Farsi to do such a thing. The same is true about enrichment in Fordow. The Americans say Iran has agreed to stop enrichment there for 15 years. The Iranian text, however, refers to this as something that Iran “will be able to do,” if it so wished.
Sometimes the two texts are diametrically opposed.
The American statement claims that Iran has agreed not to use advanced centrifuges, each of which could do the work of 10 old ones. The Iranian text, however, insists that “on the basis of solutions found, work on advanced centrifuges shall continue on the basis of a 10-year plan.”
The American text claims that Iran has agreed to dismantle the core of the heavy water plutonium plant in Arak. The Iranian text says the opposite. The plant shall remain and be updated and modernized.
Kerry and Obama:...the Iranian nuclear project and its military-industrial offshoots would be put under a kind of international tutelage for 10, 15 or even 25 years.
However, the Persian, Italian and French texts contain no such figures.
The US talks of sanctions “ relief” while Iran claims the sanctions would be “immediately terminated.”
The American text claims Tehran has agreed to take measures to reassure the international community on military aspects of its nuclear project...There is absolutely no echo of that in the Iranian and other non-American texts.
"Parameter: : a rule or limit that controls what something is or how something should be done."-Merriam Webster.
[A "rule" is not the same as a "limit." But the definition of "parameter" includes both, or either in the conjunctive. It is reasonably clear from context that Parameters uses parameter as meaning "a rule...that controls what something is or how something should be done." We will then substitute "rule" wherever Parameters uses parameters.
-"Rules for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action."
-"Below...key rules." These were decided."] Pause here for the article in the next post.
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These
elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between
now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between
the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to
negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the
JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
[A "rule" is not the same as a "limit." But the definition of "parameter" includes both, or either in the conjunctive. It is reasonably clear from context that Parameters uses parameter as meaning "a rule...that controls what something is or how something should be done." We will then substitute "rule" wherever Parameters uses parameters.
-"Rules for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action."
-"Below...key rules." These were decided."] Pause here for the article in the next post.
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These
elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between
now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between
the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to
negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the
JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
"Parameter: : a rule or limit that controls what something is or how something should be done."-Merriam Webster.
I focus on "limit:" the outer boundary; the best that can be hoped for. "Although nothing is agreed until everything is agreed the parties agree that the best that can be hoped for is that "Iran agrees," and etc.
Punkin' eatin' punkin' eaters.
Punkin' eatin' punkin' eaters.
"Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
So, after that statement all the following times in which the word "agreed" is used mean nothing has been agreed since everything has not been agreed. That is punkin' eating by the Parameters. All those experts and pencils who used the word "agreement," "deal," to characterize the Parameters, those experts and pencils are punkin' eaters.
I don't like punkin' eaters.
"Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
Hell, that statement is right in the "Parameters!" That wasn't just Laurent Flabius' off-the-cuff words, that's right in the document. So, "nothing is agreed." Everything has not been agreed so nothing is agreed, so the Parameters was not agreed, therefore it was not signed, therefore it cannot be enforced, nobody can be held to the parameters. One side, the Americans, let's say, can say in the future, to the Iranians, let's say, "Look here, you're changing your position from the Parameters." The Iranians can say "Parameters, Scharameters, we didn't agree to anything."
Happy Week has officially ended.
Happy Week has officially ended.
Framework Erection.
Amid the duelling din of denunciations and approvals came a cautionary note from French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, who reminded everyone that a final pact – if was emerged – was months away at least. “Nothing is signed until everything is signed, but things are going in the right direction,” Mr. Fabius said.-Globe and Mail.
Does that mean that nothing was signed? If the Framework Erection was not signed, does that mean that it was not agreed to? If it was not agreed to then it cannot be enforced. This cannot be enforced. Therefore, working backward, it was not agreed to; it was not agreed to meaning it was not signed. This means I am unhappy.
Friday, April 03, 2015
This has been Happy Week all around. Goodluck Jonathan, the hardluck loser of this week's presidential election in Nigeria, not only conceded defeat to Muhammadu Buhari but also embraced him! Mr. Jonathan's reputation profited more by his magnaminity in defeat than by anything he did while president. God bless Goodluck Jonathan.
Hi.
Does anybody sign anything anymore? Are we such a harmonious, happy, you're-okay,-I'm-okay, I-trust-you,-you-trust-me, lovey-dovey-turtle-dovey, spit-swapping, I'll- massage-your-prostate-if-you-massage-mine, "We're cool, dude," world that a formal diplomatic document needs no signature, just "###?" Is that what this world has come to, a bunch of "###"? Makes me sick. What the hell is "####"? Why isn't that thing signed? OR why are there not signature lines for the parties? Somebody could have had that typed up at the Lausanne Kinkos and distributed to the press.
Does anybody sign anything anymore? Are we such a harmonious, happy, you're-okay,-I'm-okay, I-trust-you,-you-trust-me, lovey-dovey-turtle-dovey, spit-swapping, I'll- massage-your-prostate-if-you-massage-mine, "We're cool, dude," world that a formal diplomatic document needs no signature, just "###?" Is that what this world has come to, a bunch of "###"? Makes me sick. What the hell is "####"? Why isn't that thing signed? OR why are there not signature lines for the parties? Somebody could have had that typed up at the Lausanne Kinkos and distributed to the press.
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These
elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between
now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between
the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to
negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the
JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will
go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only
5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s
first-generation centrifuge.
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored
storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15
years.
• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile
material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be
extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only
into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium
• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
1.
• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The
remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure
will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation
centrifuges for ten years.
• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models)
centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place
them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium
for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its
advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to
by the P5+1.
• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to
ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the
JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment
capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear faciliities, including to Iran’s
enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including
the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The
new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or
components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium
mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows
production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will
be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be
placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to
monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
2.
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional
transparency measure.
• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA
much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both
declared and undeclared facilities.
• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or
allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production
facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of
construction of new facilities.
• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding
the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a
design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium,
and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant
quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s
lifetime.
• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and
development on spent nuclear fuel.
• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor,
and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified
that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its
commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
3.
• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of
the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant
non-performance.
• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted
simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key
concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with
transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN
Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full
implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will
serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and
ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset
freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to
seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then
all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will
remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development
– ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its
longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the
P5+1.
• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will
not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of
enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years.
Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its
significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium
supply chain will last for 25 years.
• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran
will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These
elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between
now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between
the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to
negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the
JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
Enrichment
• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will
go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only
5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s
first-generation centrifuge.
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored
storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15
years.
• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile
material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be
extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only
into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium
• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
1.
• Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The
remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure
will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation
centrifuges for ten years.
• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models)
centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
• Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place
them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
• Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium
for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its
advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to
by the P5+1.
• For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to
ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the
JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment
capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
• The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear faciliities, including to Iran’s
enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including
the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
• Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The
new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or
components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
• Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium
mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
• Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows
production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will
be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
• All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be
placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
• A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to
monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
2.
certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional
transparency measure.
• Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA
much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both
declared and undeclared facilities.
• Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or
allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production
facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
• Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of
construction of new facilities.
• Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding
the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
• Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a
design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium,
and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
• The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant
quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
• Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s
lifetime.
• Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and
development on spent nuclear fuel.
• Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor,
and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
• Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
• U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified
that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its
commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
3.
• The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of
the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant
non-performance.
• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted
simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key
concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with
transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN
Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full
implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will
serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and
ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset
freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to
seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then
all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will
remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development
– ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its
longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the
P5+1.
• For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will
not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of
enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years.
Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its
significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium
supply chain will last for 25 years.
• Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran
will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s
development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its
nuclear program.
4.
###
5.
It has come to the belated attention of the undersigned that the Framework Erection was reduced to writing. Here it is https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1700189/parametersirannuclearprogram.pdf
Friends, enemies, it is a Great Friday when there is cheering in the streets of Tehran and smiles in Lausanne, Washington, Moscow...Beijing, Ugh! Paris, and London, when the only unhappy people are Boehner and his bartender in Columbus and Benny and his jets in Jerusalem.
I join! I join hands with these in orgiastic frisson, I jump up and down and grab my genitals in singing their praises and then I join hands with them in welcoming Iran back into our family, the family of nations, and in joy that Iran has been talked back into the Stone Age for 10-15 or 25 years or however many years AND in joy, true joy, in admitting that,
I
was
WRONG.
Joy, says I.
I should like to ask one question through my delirium, Where the FUCK does it say Iran will not have nukes for 10-15 or 25 years in that goddamned oral performance; why are there differences in the years (This is one compound question.); show me the word "year" in the oration; is that an accurate transcript from noble vox.com?
Have a nice day.
I join! I join hands with these in orgiastic frisson, I jump up and down and grab my genitals in singing their praises and then I join hands with them in welcoming Iran back into our family, the family of nations, and in joy that Iran has been talked back into the Stone Age for 10-15 or 25 years or however many years AND in joy, true joy, in admitting that,
I
was
WRONG.
Joy, says I.
I should like to ask one question through my delirium, Where the FUCK does it say Iran will not have nukes for 10-15 or 25 years in that goddamned oral performance; why are there differences in the years (This is one compound question.); show me the word "year" in the oration; is that an accurate transcript from noble vox.com?
Have a nice day.
Today resembled the Black Friday shopping rush in the U.S. for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China's alternative to the U.S.-dominated Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. It was a good Friday for the startup. 46 countries joined despite bad-mouthing from the U.S. including Taiwan, Great Britain, Germany, France, Australia, Norway, and Brazil. It was a "stampede" says the New York Times, "stunning" even the Chinese.
Chinese are a humble, traumatized, cautious, yet ambitious people. They do their homework. They remind me of a young Abraham Lincoln who wrote "I will study and get ready and someday my chance will come."
Chinese are a humble, traumatized, cautious, yet ambitious people. They do their homework. They remind me of a young Abraham Lincoln who wrote "I will study and get ready and someday my chance will come."
China Indicts Highest Figure Since Gang of Four.
Zhou Yongkang, former state security chief, has been charged with the usual corruption offenses. His real offense was in aiding Bo Xilai's attempt to become Paramount Leader. Bo, an anti-corruption zealot, is serving a life sentence for...corruption. His wife, Gu Kailai, the same for the murder of the non-murdered British national Neil Heywood.
Thursday, April 02, 2015
Framework Erection Eruption.
Well:
"Officials laid out on Thursday what amounted to goals for a deal by the end of June that would place constraints and controls on Iran’s nuclear work for up to 25 years, with severe limits for the first decade."-Wall Street Journal.
"This is an astonishingly good Iran deal."-Vox.com.
"A good deal with Iran."-New York Times (William J. Burns).
"Officials laid out on Thursday what amounted to goals for a deal by the end of June that would place constraints and controls on Iran’s nuclear work for up to 25 years, with severe limits for the first decade."-Wall Street Journal.
"This is an astonishingly good Iran deal."-Vox.com.
"A good deal with Iran."-New York Times (William J. Burns).
"[T]he overwhelming verdict of nuclear and arms control experts is that diplomacy has delivered a result...This agreement, if codified and implemented in full, will constrain Iran's nuclear programme for some 10 to 15 years."-BBC.
Well...Okay, this is the deal: you can put your faith in the Wall Street Journal, the BBC, Vox.com, and the New York Times. OR ME. Ready to rule?...Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait...Think about it a little bit. Reflect. Clear your mind...Okay? Okay, let me rephrase the question to make it more fair to both sides. YOU'RE EITHER WITH ME OR YOU'RE AGAINST ME! All those with me, RAISE YOUR HANDS!
Well...Okay, this is the deal: you can put your faith in the Wall Street Journal, the BBC, Vox.com, and the New York Times. OR ME. Ready to rule?...Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait...Think about it a little bit. Reflect. Clear your mind...Okay? Okay, let me rephrase the question to make it more fair to both sides. YOU'RE EITHER WITH ME OR YOU'RE AGAINST ME! All those with me, RAISE YOUR HANDS!
Really? Yeah, I'm with her, too.
Framework Erection?
Is that the Erected Framework? That is the transcript of oral remarks made by the EU's representative, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Mohammad Zarif. I thought the Erection was supposed to be in writing, not a very long erection, only "2-3" pages but at least physical, in writing, like with "names" and such. I did not understand that this was to be an Oral Erection. Maybe the physical erection is to come after this oral performance, I don't know, but Mohammad Zarif can now claim his hands were never on any erection. That's just not an erection to me, sorry!
Framework Erection.
Here is the transcript which I stole from vox.com. http://www.vox.com/2015/4/2/8336723/iran-nuclear-deal-transcript
We, the European Union High Representative and the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, together with the Foreign Ministers of the E3 + 3, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, met from 26 March to 2 April 2014 in Switzerland, as agreed in November 2013, to gather here to find solutions towards reaching a comprehensive solution that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program and the comprehensive lifting of all sanctions.
Today we have taken a decisive step. We have reached solutions on key parameters of a joint comprehensive plan of action. The political determination, the goodwill and the hard work of all parties made it possible and let us thank all delegations for their tireless dedication.
This is a crucial declaration laying the agreed basis for the final text of the joint comprehensive plan of action. We can now restart drafting the text and annexes of the joint comprehensive plan of action, guided by the solutions developed in these days.
As Iran pursues a peaceful nuclear program, Iran's enrichment capacity, enrichment level and stockpile will be limited for specific durations and there will be no other enrichment facility than Natanz.
Iran's research and development on centrifuges will be carried out on a scope and schedule that has been mutually agreed. Fordow will be converted from an enrichment site into a nuclear physics and technology center. International collaboration will be encouraged in agreed areas of research. There will not be any fissile material at Fordow.
An international joint venture will assist Iran in redesigning and rebuilding a modernized heavy water research reactor in Arak that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. There will be no reprocessing, and spent fuel will be exported. A set of measures have been agreed to monitor the provisions of the JCPOA including implementation of the modified code 3.1 and provision of the additional protocol.
The International Atomic Energy Agency will be permitted the use of modern technologies and will have announced access through agreed procedures including to clarify past and present issues. Iran will take part in international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy which can include supply of power and research reactors. Another important area of cooperation will be in the field of nuclear safety and security.
The European Union will terminate the implementation of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions and the United States will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments.
A new UN Security Council resolution will endorse the JCPOA, terminate all previous nuclear-related resolutions, and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time. We will now work to write the text of a joint comprehensive plan of action including its technical details in the coming weeks and months at the political and experts level. We are committed to complete our efforts by June 30.
We would like to thank the Swiss government for its generous support in hosting these negotiations, and let me personally and on behalf of everybody also thank you all, journalists and media from around the world, for having followed our work and somehow also worked with us over this difficult but intense and positive week.
Islam Murders 147 at University in Kenya.
OH! President Obama will be visiting Kenya this July...I bet there's a run on Imodium in the halls of the Secret Service over that today, huh? Hoo-doggie.
OH! Updates, forgot about these till now. NSA Special Agent Maya, nee Ricky Shawatza, Hall
was transgendered. Riding a two-person unit the day in question, Special Agent Kevin Lamont Fleming
And Tomato Andi, nee Andreas Gunter, Lubitz was researching how to commit suicide and how to break into airplane cockpit doors.
was transgendered. Riding a two-person unit the day in question, Special Agent Kevin Lamont Fleming
accompanied Hall and is still alive though not perky.
And Tomato Andi, nee Andreas Gunter, Lubitz was researching how to commit suicide and how to break into airplane cockpit doors.
Wednesday, April 01, 2015
How must this look to the other 5 of the 5+1? They're in the same room with Kerry, watching him. China especially is getting a very good look at the strengths and weaknesses of Kerry's negotiating ability. John-John has now spent more time face-to-face with Iran's Mohammed Zarif than with any other foreign diplomat. Bet Sergey Lavrov's glad about that.
I was beginning to doubt my memory so I checked. This is what Obama said before the United Nations in 2012:
"Make no mistake: A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained...the United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon."
"Make no mistake: A nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained...the United States will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon."
And:
June 5, 2008, in Cairo: "I will continue to be clear on the fact that an Iranian nuclear weapon would be profoundly destabilizing for the entire region.It is strongly in America's interest to prevent such a scenario."
June 8, 2008, to AIPAC: "The danger from Iran is grave, it is real, and my goal will be to eliminate this threat.... Finally, let there be no doubt: I will always keep the threat of military action on the table to defend our security and our ally Israel."
October 7 2008, in the second presidential debate: "We cannot allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon. It would be a game-changer in the region. Not only would it threaten Israel, our strongest ally in the region and one of our strongest allies in the world, but it would also create a possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. And so it's unacceptable. And I will do everything that's required to prevent it. And we will never take military options off the table,"
November 7, 2008, press conference: "Iran's development of a nuclear weapon, I believe, is unacceptable. And we have to mount an international effort to prevent that from happening."
February 27, 2009, speech at Camp Lejeune: "(W)e are focusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing a strategy to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; and actively seeking a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world."
January 27, 2010, State of the Union address: "And as Iran's leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: They, too, will face growing consequences. That is a promise."
July 1, /2010, at the signing of the Iran Sanctions Act: "There should be no doubt -- the United States and the international community are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."
May 19, 2011, speech on the Middle East: "Now, our opposition to Iran's intolerance and Iran's repressive measures, as well as its illicit nuclear program and its support of terror, is well known."
May 22, 2011, in an address to AIPAC:"You also see our commitment to our shared security in our determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.... So let me be absolutely clear -- we remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."
October 13,2011, press conference after meeting with South Korean president:"Now, we don't take any options off the table in terms of how we operate with Iran."
November 14, 2011, press conference: "So what I did was to speak with President Medvedev, as well as President Hu, and all three of us entirely agree on the objective, which is making sure that Iran does not weaponize nuclear power and that we don't trigger a nuclear arms race in the region. That's in the interests of all of us... I have said repeatedly and I will say it today, we are not taking any options off the table, because it's my firm belief that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would pose a security threat not only to the region but also to the United States."
December 8, 2011, press conference: (In response to question about pressuring Iran): "No options off the table means I'm considering all options."
December 16, 2011, speech to the General Assembly of the Union for Reform Judaism: "Another grave concern -- and a threat to the security of Israel, the United States and the world -- is Iran's nuclear program. And that's why our policy has been absolutely clear: We are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons...and that's why, rest assured, we will take no options off the table. We have been clear."
January 24, 2012, State of the Union address: "Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal."
March 2, 2012, interview with Goldblog: "I... don't, as a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say."
March 4, 2012, speech to AIPAC: "I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say That includes all elements of American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency."
March 5, 2012, remarks after meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu: "... I reserve all options, and my policy here is not going to be one of containment. My policy is prevention of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. And as I indicated yesterday in my speech, when I say all options are at the table, I mean it."
March 6, 2012, press conference: "And what I have said is, is that we will not countenance Iran getting a nuclear weapon. My policy is not containment; my policy is to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon -- because if they get a nuclear weapon that could trigger an arms race in the region, it would undermine our non-proliferation goals, it could potentially fall into the hands of terrorists.
March 14, 2012, remarks after meeting with David Cameron: "...And as I said in a speech just a couple of weeks ago, I am determined not simply to contain Iran that is in possession of a nuclear weapon; I am determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon -- in part for the reasons that David mentioned... We will do everything we can to resolve this diplomatically, but ultimately, we've got to have somebody on the other side of the table who's taking this seriously."
Man, great job by The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg there, October 2,
That is remarkable. Obama was one-note Johnny for five years, until Rouhani became president of Iran. Obama has changed! Iran has not. How?-Why?
“The diplomatic endgame is a struggle over competing, essentially contradictory, narratives,” said Robert S. Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, whose latest work, “Iran’s Nuclear Chess: Calculating America’s Moves,” explores this division.
“To sell a nuclear agreement in Washington, Obama must make the case that it buys time in the face of an urgent threat and that it will support the process of internal reform within Iran,” Mr. Litwak said. “To sell a nuclear agreement to the hard-liners in Tehran, Zarif’s team must make the case that it recognizes Iran’s ‘rights,’ leaves Iran with a future hedge option for a weapon, and is not putting Iran on a slippery slope to be pressured by America for additional demands that would undermine the foundations of the revolutionary state.”-The New York Times.
“To sell a nuclear agreement in Washington, Obama must make the case that it buys time in the face of an urgent threat and that it will support the process of internal reform within Iran,” Mr. Litwak said. “To sell a nuclear agreement to the hard-liners in Tehran, Zarif’s team must make the case that it recognizes Iran’s ‘rights,’ leaves Iran with a future hedge option for a weapon, and is not putting Iran on a slippery slope to be pressured by America for additional demands that would undermine the foundations of the revolutionary state.”-The New York Times.
When?-How?-Why?-did Obama's position change from "A nuclear Iran cannot be contained" to "We're settling for a one-year head start if they decide to build a bomb?"
"One cannot negotiate on one's knees."
Von Clausewitz or somebody smart. That is good post-it note philosophy. You can't, you can't negotiate from a position of abject weakness.
Unless you're negotiating with John Kerry.
Iran is on its knees, "crippled" with economic sanctions, threatened with military attack, experienced with cyber attack, a pariah state in the world. The "5+1" most powerful states in the world, spearheaded by John Kerry, hold all the cards. And yet, Iran, negotiating from its knees, is causing them to fold against a pair of deuces.
Only with John Kerry.
Unless you're negotiating with John Kerry.
Iran is on its knees, "crippled" with economic sanctions, threatened with military attack, experienced with cyber attack, a pariah state in the world. The "5+1" most powerful states in the world, spearheaded by John Kerry, hold all the cards. And yet, Iran, negotiating from its knees, is causing them to fold against a pair of deuces.
Only with John Kerry.
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