“The diplomatic endgame is a struggle over competing, essentially contradictory, narratives,” said Robert S. Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, whose latest work, “Iran’s Nuclear Chess: Calculating America’s Moves,” explores this division.
“To sell a nuclear agreement in Washington, Obama must make the case that it buys time in the face of an urgent threat and that it will support the process of internal reform within Iran,” Mr. Litwak said. “To sell a nuclear agreement to the hard-liners in Tehran, Zarif’s team must make the case that it recognizes Iran’s ‘rights,’ leaves Iran with a future hedge option for a weapon, and is not putting Iran on a slippery slope to be pressured by America for additional demands that would undermine the foundations of the revolutionary state.”-The New York Times.
“To sell a nuclear agreement in Washington, Obama must make the case that it buys time in the face of an urgent threat and that it will support the process of internal reform within Iran,” Mr. Litwak said. “To sell a nuclear agreement to the hard-liners in Tehran, Zarif’s team must make the case that it recognizes Iran’s ‘rights,’ leaves Iran with a future hedge option for a weapon, and is not putting Iran on a slippery slope to be pressured by America for additional demands that would undermine the foundations of the revolutionary state.”-The New York Times.
When?-How?-Why?-did Obama's position change from "A nuclear Iran cannot be contained" to "We're settling for a one-year head start if they decide to build a bomb?"
