*This post "obsoletes" the post entitled "JCPOA ANNEX 1."
Upon information and belief this is the money shot section for Americans, Israelis, American Jews and swine Aipac. This is what Iran has agreed to do.
The JCPOA is incorporated as Annex A with some differences. First below is from the Preface to 2231. The undersigned does not know if the Preface is binding. A preface seems to be a further degree of removal from the agreement than a preamble and general provisions. However, Iran signed this document, the Preface is referenced in the Preamble and General Provisions, the whole of the document includes the Preface and Preamble and General Provisions and the United Nations Security Council has made the whole document binding international law via 2231.:
Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna,
14 July 2015
PREFACE
...Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)...will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful...Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons...
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively
peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme...
"Iran envisions": squishy.
In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.
Nothing squishy about that. No nuclear weapons. Period.
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
...
iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran unambiguously "reaffirms" that it will not acquire nuclear weapons forever and the below steps are what Iran has agreed to do, they are the "voluntary measures" that Iran has agreed to take which are now legally binding upon Iran via this Security Council Resolution. The purpose of these measures is to give "confidence" to the UN that Iran's "reaffirmation" in paragraph iii is truthful and factual, i.e that it gets done, that Iran "under no circumstances will...ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within
the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes
NUCLEAR
A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1. Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium
enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain
limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first
8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next
stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as
described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as
expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be
submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s
Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran’s enrichment R&D with uranium for
10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in
Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for
enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6
and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8
centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace
failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture
advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to
manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without
rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA
continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran’s long-term
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to
3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium
enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint
partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1
centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The
11/104
other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All
other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and
stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its
uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to
be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in
return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to
natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from
Russia or other sources for use in Iran’s nuclear reactors will not be counted
against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I
are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support
assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as
appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel
produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and
20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any
additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at
international market prices.
B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in
Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %,
in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design.
The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production
for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor
will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all
of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for
the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will
be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international
partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other
countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as
the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before
Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the
responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological
advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research
reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of
supply of necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for
export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and
research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for
in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any
spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel
12/104
reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel
reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed
exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from
irradiated enriched uranium targets.
C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament),
Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional
Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in
Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
Outstanding Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to
address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as
raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65).
Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will
be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will
provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past
and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in
their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution
to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing
the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary
measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency
measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a
long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore
concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for
25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for
20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including
on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable
mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,
as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including
uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this
JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council
resolution.
Having now read, studied and researched this money shot the undersigned reaffirms that he is fer the Iran deal and not agin it and hopes the US Congress passes it or at least does not override POTUS veto.
Done and Ordered this day, & etc.
Upon information and belief this is the money shot section for Americans, Israelis, American Jews and swine Aipac. This is what Iran has agreed to do.
The JCPOA is incorporated as Annex A with some differences. First below is from the Preface to 2231. The undersigned does not know if the Preface is binding. A preface seems to be a further degree of removal from the agreement than a preamble and general provisions. However, Iran signed this document, the Preface is referenced in the Preamble and General Provisions, the whole of the document includes the Preface and Preamble and General Provisions and the United Nations Security Council has made the whole document binding international law via 2231.:
Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna,
14 July 2015
PREFACE
...Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)...will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful...Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons...
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively
peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme...
"Iran envisions": squishy.
In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.
Nothing squishy about that. No nuclear weapons. Period.
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
...
iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran unambiguously "reaffirms" that it will not acquire nuclear weapons forever and the below steps are what Iran has agreed to do, they are the "voluntary measures" that Iran has agreed to take which are now legally binding upon Iran via this Security Council Resolution. The purpose of these measures is to give "confidence" to the UN that Iran's "reaffirmation" in paragraph iii is truthful and factual, i.e that it gets done, that Iran "under no circumstances will...ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within
the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes
NUCLEAR
A. ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1. Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium
enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain
limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first
8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next
stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as
described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as
expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be
submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s
Safeguards Agreement.
2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran’s enrichment R&D with uranium for
10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in
Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for
enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6
and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8
centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace
failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture
advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to
manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without
rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA
continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran’s long-term
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.
5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to
3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium
enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6. Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint
partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1
centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The
11/104
other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All
other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and
stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
7. During the 15 year period, and as Iran gradually moves to meet international
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its
uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to
be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in
return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to
natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from
Russia or other sources for use in Iran’s nuclear reactors will not be counted
against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I
are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support
assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as
appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel
produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and
20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any
additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at
international market prices.
B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in
Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %,
in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design.
The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production
for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor
will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all
of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for
the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will
be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international
partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other
countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as
the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before
Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the
responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.
9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological
advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research
reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of
supply of necessary fuel.
10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for
export to the international market.
11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and
research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for
in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.
12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any
spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel
12/104
reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel
reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed
exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from
irradiated enriched uranium targets.
C. TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament),
Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional
Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in
Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.
14. Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present
Outstanding Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to
address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear programme as
raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65).
Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will
be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will
provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past
and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in
their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution
to the Board of Governors for taking necessary action, with a view to closing
the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.
15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary
measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency
measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a
long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore
concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for
25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for
20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including
on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable
mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,
as defined in Annex I.
16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could
contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including
uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.
17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this
JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council
resolution.
Having now read, studied and researched this money shot the undersigned reaffirms that he is fer the Iran deal and not agin it and hopes the US Congress passes it or at least does not override POTUS veto.
Done and Ordered this day, & etc.
